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Introduction
”There’s pretty strong evidence that the rise in uncertainty is a sig-
niﬁcant factor holding back the pace of recovery now. [...] research
shows that heightened uncertainty slows economic growth, raises un-
employment, and reduces inﬂationary pressures. [...] There’s no
question that slow growth, high unemployment, and signiﬁcant un-
certainty are challenges for monetary policy.”
John Williams, President and Chief Executive Oﬃcer of the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF Economic Letter, January 21, 2013.
The literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of uncertainty shocks has de-
veloped quite fastly in the last few years. This is mainly due to the recent
contribution by Bloom (2009), which builds on a previous model by Bernanke
(1983) to show that entrepreneurs facing an uncertain economic environment
assign a higher value to the option of implementing ”wait-and-see” strategies
which lead to a pause in investments. As a consequence, economic activities go
bust in the short run, which consequences involving prices and monetary policy
setting.
Bloom (2009) established that volatility shocks are strongly correlated with
other measures of uncertainty, like the cross-sectional spread of ﬁrm- and industry-
level earnings and productivity growth. Moreover, he noticed that the uncer-
tainty is also a ubiquitous concern of policymakers, as the opening statement of
this thesis also conﬁrms.
After Bloom’s article, there has been a number of contributions in this litera-
ture. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) set up a theoretical model to investigate
whether all the increased uncertainty about mix and timing of ﬁscal austerity
has had a detrimental impact on current business conditions through its eﬀect
on expectations and behavior of households and ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that the ﬁscal
volatility shocks reduce economics activity: aggregate output, consumption and
investment; the increase in ﬁscal policy uncertainty of two standard deviation
has an eﬀect similar to 25-basis-point innovation in federal funds rate and ﬁnally
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that heightened ﬁscal policy uncertainty is ”stagﬂationary”: it creates inﬂation
while output falls.
Recent empirical VAR-based investigations conﬁrm that shocks to uncer-
tainty are an important driver behind macroeconomic ﬂuctuations (Bloom (2009),
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013), Leduc and Liu (2013), Mumtaz and Theodor-
idis (2012)). Typically, uncertainty matters in a context in which risk matters.
In particular, some recent research has pointed out the time-dependence of risk
aversion and discount factors and risk aversion tends to be high during phases
of stress like recessions. In particular, Leduc and Liu (2013) show that, in
an economy featuring real matching frictions in the labor market and using a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, uncertainty shocks act as ”de-
mand” shocks, in that they increase unemployment and decrease inﬂation. This
is so because positive uncertainty shocks negatively aﬀect potential output and
this occurs because ﬁrms pause hiring new workers when uncertainty hits the
economy due to lower expected value of a ﬁlled vacancy. As a consequence,
ﬁrms post a lower number of vacancies, so inducing a drop in the job ﬁnding
rate and an increase in unemployment rate.
Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012) propose a model in which nominal frictions
aﬀecting wage and price re-setting induce a reaction to uncertainty shocks sim-
ilar to the one that occurs when supply shocks hit the economy. This is due to
the fact that risk-averse workers ask for a wage-premium to ensure themselves
against the scenario which may be seen them called to work extra-hours at a
predetermined wage (due to wage stickiness). In reaction to workers’ request of
a higher wage, ﬁrms increase their prices to lower the burden of real wages on
their marginal costs. As a result, uncertainty shocks act as inﬂationary, supply
shocks in their model.
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) investigate the role of economic policy un-
certainty shocks. They create a new economic policy uncertainty index based
on a variety of components (news, forecasters’ disagreement), and employ it in a
VAR context to investigate the eﬀects of exogenous variations of uncertainty on
the U.S. macroeconomic environment. They ﬁnd that an increse in uncertainty
comparable to the one recorded in the U.S. after the acceleration of the ﬁnancial
crises may have been an important driver of the economic downturns observed
in 2009 and 2010.
This thesis aims at contributing to this literature by asking the following
question: Does economic policy uncertainty inﬂuence the labor market dynamics
in the United States? To tackle this question, we use actual U.S. data from the
ﬁrst quarter of 1985 to the third quarter of 2010 and estimate a VAR including
labor market’s variables (the unemployment rate, the job creation’s rate, the
job destruction’s rate, the job ﬁnding rate), the policy uncertainty index ` a la
Baker et al (2013), the Federal Funds rate, the inﬂation rate, the output gap
and the VIX index related to the U.S. economy. After estimating our VAR, we
make extensive use of the impulse response and variance decomposition analyses
to pin down the role played by economic policy uncertainty shocks in aﬀecting
the U.S. labor market dynamics.
Our results point to a clear impact on exogenous increases in the economic7
policy uncertainty indicator on unemployment and other-labor market related
variables. This is true even when controlling for alternative, broader volatil-
ity indicators like the VIX, measures of the business cycle like real GDP, and
indicators of monetary policy stance like the nominal interest rate and inﬂa-
tion. Diﬀerently, we ﬁnd the reaction of inﬂation to be quantitatively mild
and, above all, statistically insigniﬁcant for most of the horizons following our
simulated uncertainty shock. Our results corroborate those proposed by Leduc
and Liu (2013) on the relevance of uncertainty shock as far as the real side of
the economy is concerned. Diﬀerently, we ﬁnd mild evidence at best on such
shocks as being behind inﬂation dynamics in the United States. Therefore, we
cast some doubts on the robustness of Leduc and Liu’s results as far as the
uncertainty-inﬂation relationship is concerned.
This thesis is structured as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we introduce the VAR
theory and how to use it and all the functions useful for the analysis (the impulse
response function, the causality test, etc). In the second section, we explain the
theoretical model ` a la Leduc and Liu (2013) to have a theoretical benchmark to
interpret the impulse response functions of interest. The third section proposes
our VAR analysis based on the U.S. data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 to the
third quarter in 2010. First of all, we present and describe all the variables that
we use in the models and we analyse two diﬀerent models, one with the VIX
index, which is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices, and the other without it. In
practice we try to study, using the VIX index, if the stock market inﬂuences the
economic policy uncertainty and if there are possible new relationships between
the labor market variables and the economic policy uncertainty shocks. Since we
identify some clear outliers during the 2008-2009 ﬁnancial crisis, we move to an
analysis focusing on pre-crisis data. Then, we introduce in our investigation the
policy uncertainty index ` a la Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) and check if there
are some diﬀerences respect to the other previous models in terms of impulse
response function and variance decomposition. In the last section, we conclude
our thesis and in the appendix we explain some important economic events
related to our analysis, some mathematical proofs and some FEVD tables.8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTIONChapter 2
VAR and SVAR Models
In this chapter we introduce the stationary ﬁnite order vector autoregressive
(VAR) model, it is one of the most successful, ﬂexible and easy to use models
for the analysis of multivariate time series. It is a natural extension of the
univariate autoregressive model to dynamic multivariate time series. As Sims
(1980) used, the VAR model has proven to be especially useful for describing the
dynamic behavior of economic and ﬁnancial time series and for the forecasting
and structural analysis.
In addition to data description and forecasting, the VAR model is also used
for structural inference and policy analysis. In structural analysis, certain as-
sumption about the causal structure of data under investigation are imposed,
and the resulting causal impacts of unexpected shocks or innovations to spec-
iﬁed variables on the variables in the model are summarized. These causal
impacts are usually summarized with impulse response function and forecast
error variance decomposition.
The model of interest is assumed to be known, but this assumption is not
true in the real life, and it helps us to see the problems related to VAR models
without contamination by estimation and speciﬁcation issues. In the following
section, we describe the principal properties and the important functions of a
VAR model.
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Properties of VAR
Model
2.1.1 Stable VAR Model
We start our analysis from the VAR(p) model (Vector Autoregressive model of
order p)
yt = ν + A1yt−1 + ···+ Apyt−p + ut,t =0 ,±1,±2,... (2.1)
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where yt =( y1t,...,y Kt)￿ is a (K ×1) random vector, the Ai are ﬁxed (K ×K)
coeﬃcient matrices, ν =( ν1,...,ν K)￿ is a ﬁxed (K × 1) vector of intercept
terms allowing for the possibility of a nonzero mean E(yt). Than the ut =
(u1t,...,u Kt)￿ is a (K × 1) vector, called white noise or innovation process,
such that E(ut) = 0 and
E(utus)=
￿
Σu, if t = s
0, if t ￿= s
where the Σu is assumed to be nonsingular (invertible)
To understand the general VAR model of order p described by (2.1), we
consider the VAR(1) model:
yt = ν + A1yt−1 + ut. (2.3)
If this generation mechanism starts at some time t = 1, we have:
y1 = ν + A1y0 + u1
y2 = ν + A1y1 + u2 = ν + A1(ν + A1y0 + u1)+u2
=( IK + A1)ν + A2
1y0 + A1u1 + u2
. . . (2.4)
yt =( IK + A1 + ···+ A
t−1
1 )ν + At
1y0 +
t−1 ￿
i=0
Ai
1ut−i
. . .
The vectors y1,...,y t are uniquely determined by y0,u 1,...,u t and also the joint
distribution of y1,...,y t is determined by the joint distribution of y0,u 1,...,u t.
We consider the VAR(1) process and using the (2.4) we have
yt = ν + A1yt−1 + ut
=( IK + A1 + ···+ A
j
1)ν + A
j+1
1 yt−j−1 +
j ￿
i=0
Ai
1ut−i.
If all eigenvalues of A1 have modulus less than 1, the sequence Ai
1,i=0 ,1,...
is absolutely summable 1 and we have also that
(IK + A1 + ···+ A
j
1)ν −−−→
j→∞
(IK − A1)−1ν.
1As e q u e n c eo f( K × K)m a t r i c e s{Ai =( amn,i)},i =0 ,±1,±2,... is absolutely
summable if each sequence {amn,i},m,n=1 ,...,K;i =0 ,±1,±2i sa b s o l u t e l ys u m m a b l e .
{Ai} is absolutely summable if the sequence {||Ai||} is summable, where
||Ai|| =
„X
m
X
n
a2
mn,i
«1/2
exists and it is ﬁnite2.1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VAR MODEL 11
Furthermore, A
j+1
1 converges to zero rapidly as j →∞and so we ignore the
term A
j+1
1 yt−j−1 in the limit. Also if all eigenvalues of A1 have modulus less
than 1, then yt is the well-deﬁned stochastic process:
yt = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
Ai
1ut−i,t =0 ,±1,±2,...
where µ := (IK − A1)−1ν. The distribution and the joint distributions of the
yt’s are uniquely determined by the distributions of the ut process. We calculate
the ﬁrst and the second moment:
E[yt]=µ ∀t
Γy(h): =E [ ( yt − µ)(yt − µ)￿]=
∞ ￿
i=0
A
h+i
1 ΣuAi
￿
1 .
Deﬁnition 1. We call a VAR(1) process stable if all eigenvalues of A1 have
modulus less than 1 and it is equivalent to:
det(IK − A1z) ￿= 0 for|z|≤1. (2.5)
We extend this discussion to a VAR(p) process, in fact a VAR(p) corresponds
to a Kp-dimensional VAR(1):
Yt = ν + AYt−1 + Ut (2.6)
where: Yt :=

 


yt
yt−1
. . .
yt−p+1

 


ν :=

 


ν
0
. . .
0

 


A :=



 


A1 A2 ··· Ap−1 Ap
IK 0 ··· 00
0 IK 00
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
00 ··· IK 0



 


Ut :=


 

ut
0
. . .
0


 

where Yt, ν and Ut are (Kp× 1) vectors and the matrix A is (Kp× Kp).
Deﬁnition 2. The VAR(p)p r o c e s si sstable if
det(IKp−Az) ￿= 0 for|z|≤1 ⇐⇒ det(IK−A1z−···−Apzp) ￿= 0 for|z|≤1.
A stochastic process is stationary if its ﬁrst and second moments do not
change with time t. So a stochastic process yt is stationary if
E(yt)=µ for all t (2.7)
E[(yt − µ)(yt−h − µ)￿]=Γ y(h)=Γ y(−h)￿ for all t and h =0 ,1,2,... (2.8)12 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
From (2.7) all the yt have the same ﬁnite mean vector µ and from (2.8) the
autocovariances of the process do not depend on t but only on h that is the lag
period.
Proposition 1. If a VAR process is stable, then it is stationary.
2.1.2 The Moving Average Representation of a VAR Pro-
cess
The VAR(p)p r o c e s sYt have also an other representation under the stability
assumption:
Yt = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
A
iUt−i (2.9)
and this form is called the Moving Average (MA) representation, where Yt is
expressed in terms of past and present errors or innovation vectors Ut and the
mean term µ. This representation of yt can be found by using the matrix
(K × Kp), J := [IK :0:···: 0]:
yt = JYt = Jµ+
∞ ￿
i=0
JA
iJ￿JUt−i = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
φiut−i (2.10)
where µ := Jµ, φi := JA
iJ￿, ut = JUt and the A
i and φi are absolutely
summable. We can also calculate the mean and the autocovariances
E(yt)=µ
Γy(h)=E[(yt − µ)(yt−h − µ)￿]
= E
￿￿h−1 ￿
i=0
φiut−i +
∞ ￿
i=0
φh+iut−h−i
￿￿ ∞ ￿
i=0
φiut−h−i
￿￿￿
=
∞ ￿
i=0
φh+iΣuφ￿
i.
(2.11)
2.1.3 Forecasting and Interval Forecasts
In this section we discuss predictors based on a VAR process, we want to know
the future values of variables y1,...,y K.
Forecasting
First we deﬁne an information set, called Ωt, containing the available informa-
tions in period t and may contain also the past and the present variables of the
system under consideration: Ωt = {ys|s ≤ t},w h e r eys =( y1s,...,y Ks)￿.T h e
period t, where the prediction is made, is called the forecast origin,t h en u m b e r2.1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VAR MODEL 13
of periods into the future is the forecast horizon and the predictor h periods
ahead is called the h-step predictor.
Suppose yt =( y1t,...,y Kt)i saK-dimensional stable VAR(p)p r o c e s s ,t h e n
the minimum mean squared errors (MSE) predictor for forecast horizon h at
forecast origin t is the conditional expected value:
Et(yt+h): =E(yt+h|Ωt)=E(yt+h|{ys|s ≤ t}). (2.12)
This predictor minimizes the MSE of each component of yt,i f¯ yt(h)i sh-step
predictor at origin t,
MSE[¯ yt(h)] = E[(yt+h − ¯ yt(h))(yt+h − ¯ yt(h))￿]
≥ MSE[Et(yt+h)] = E[(yt+h − Et(yt+h))(yt+h − Et(yt+h))￿]. (2.13)
The optimality of the conditional expectation can be seen by noting that:
MSE[¯ yt(h)] = MSE[Et(yt+h)] + E{[Et(yt+h) − ¯ yt(h)][Et(yt+h) − ¯ yt(h)]￿}
where the second element of the right-hand side is null, so we have that:
Et(yt+h)=ν + A1Et(yt+h−1)+···ApE(yt+h−p) (2.14)
is the optimal h-step predictor of a VAR(p) process such that Et(ut+h) = 0 for
h>0.
Interval Forecasts
We have to make an assumption about the distributions of the yt or the ut.W e
have to consider that yt,y t+1,...,y t+h have a multivariate normal distribution
for any t and h and also that ut are multivariate normal, ut ∼ N(0,Σu) and ut
and us are independent for s ￿= t. Under these assumptions, the forecast errors
are also normally distributed as linear transformations of normal vector.
yt+h(h) − yt(h) ∼ N(0,Σy(h)) ⇒
yk,t+h − yk,t(h)
σk(h)
∼ N(0,1) (2.15)
where yk,t(h)i st h ek-th component of yt(h) and σk(h) is the square root of the
k-th diagonal element of Σy(h). Let’s z(α) the upper α100 percentage point of
the normal distribution, we get:
1 − α = Pr
￿
−z(α/2) ≤
yk,t+h − yk,t(h)
σk(h)
≤ z(α/2)
￿
and the (1−α)100% interval forecast, h periods ahead, for the k-th component
of yt is
yk,t(h) ± z(α)/2σk(h).14 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
2.2 Structural Analysis
We use the VAR models to analyze the relationships between variables of interest
and we start our analysis from the two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of causality, Granger
and instantaneous.
2.2.1 Granger-Causality, Instantaneous Causality
Granger-Causality
The concept of causality (Granger 1969) is that a cause can not come after
the eﬀect. Suppose that Ωt is the information set containing all the relevant
information in the universe and including period t. Let zt(h|Ωt) be the optimal
(minimum MSE) h-step predictor of the process zt at origin t based on the
information in Ωt. The corresponding forecast MSE will be denoted by Σz(h|Ωt).
The process xt is said to cause zt in Granger’s sense if
Σz(h|Ωt) < Σz(h|Ωt \{ xs|s ≤ t}) for at least one h =1 ,2,... (2.16)
where the Ωt\{xs|s ≤ t} is the set containing all the relevant information in the
universe except for the information in the past and present of the xt process. If
xt causes zt and vice versa, the process (z￿
t,x ￿
t)￿ is called feedback system.
If we have a VAR process yt, written in the canonical MA representation:
yt = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
φiut−i = µ + φ(L)ut,φ 0 = IK (2.17)
where ut is a white noise process with nonsingular covariance matrix Σu.W e
write the VAR process as
yt =
￿
zt
xt
￿
=
￿
µ1
µ2
￿
+
￿
φ11(L) φ12(L)
φ21(L) φ22(L)
￿￿
u1t
u2t
￿
. (2.18)
Proposition 2. Let yt be a VAR process as in 2.18, then zt is not Granger-
caused by xt if and only if φ12 =0 .
Corollary 1. If we take a stationary and stable VAR(p) process:
yt =
￿
zt
xt
￿
=
￿
µ1
µ2
￿
+
￿
A11,1 A12,1
A21,1 A22,1
￿￿
zt−1
xt−1
￿
+···+
￿
A11,p A12,p
A21,p A22,p
￿￿
zt−p
xt−p
￿
+
￿
u1t
u2t
￿
we have that zt is not Granger-caused by xt if and only if A12,i =0for i =
1,...,p.
Instantaneous Causality
There is also another kind of causality, called instantaneous causality between
zt and xt if
Σz(1|Ωt ∪{ xt+1}) ￿=Σ z(1|Ωt).2.2. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 15
In period t, adding xt+1 to the information set Ωt helps to improve the forecast of
zt+1 and also if there is the instantaneous causality between zt and xt,t h e nt h e r e
is also instantaneous causality between xt and zt. If we take the nonsingular
innovation covariance matrix
Σu =
￿
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
￿
where Σu = PP￿ and P is a lower triangular nonsingular matrix with positive
diagonal elements. We can write our VAR model:
yt = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
φiPP−1ut−i = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
Θiwt−i (2.19)
where Θi := φiP and wt := P−1ut is white noise with covariance matrix:
Σw = P−1Σu(P−1)￿ = IK and the wt have uncorrelated components and they
are called orthogonal residuals or innovations.
Proposition 3. Using the Σu matrix, there is no instantaneous causality be-
tween zt and xt if and only if
Σ12 = E(u1tu￿
2t)=0 . (2.20)
2.2.2 Impulse Response Function
We have seen that the Granger-causality may not tell us all the things about
the interactions between two or more variables. In this case it’s better knowing
the response of one variable to an impulse in another variable in a system, and
it’s important because we can see the eﬀect of an exogenous shock or innovation
in one of the variables on all the other variables. We will study the causality by
ﬁnding the eﬀect of an exogenous shock or innovation in one of the variables on
the others.
Using the Granger-causality, we have that an innovation in variable k has
no eﬀect on the other variables if the former variable does not Granger-cause
the set of remaining variables, and using the mathematical functions, we have:
φjk,i = 0 for i = 1,2,... ⇐⇒ φjk,i = 0 for i = 1,...,p(K − 1)
and we know that yt is a K-dimensional stable VAR(p) process and j ￿= k.T h e
meaning is that if the ﬁrst pK − p responses of variable j to an impulse in
variable k are zero, all the following responses must also be zero.
We use the MA coeﬃcient matrices for searching the impulse and accumulate
responses. In fact the Ψn :=
￿n
i=0 Φi contains the accumulated responses over n
periods to a unit shock in the k-th variable of the system, and this quantities are
called interim multipliers. The total accumulated eﬀects for all future periods
are obtained by summing the MA coeﬃcient matrices. Ψ∞ :=
￿∞
i=0 Φi is called
the matrix of long-run eﬀects or total multipliers and it is obtained by:
Ψ∞ = Φ(1) = (IK − A1 −···−Ap)−1.16 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
We have shocks that occur in more variables and the correlation of the error
terms may indicate that a shock in one variables is likely to be accompanied by a
shock in another variable. If the correlation is null, then we have an orthogonal
response impulse function. Also we use the MA representation:
yt =
∞ ￿
i=0
Θiwt−i (2.21)
where the components of wt =( w1t,...,w Kt)￿ are uncorrelated and have unit
variance, Σw = IK and (2.21) is obtained by decomposing 2 Σu = PP￿,w h e r e
P is a lower triangular matrix and Θi =Φ iP and wt = P−1ut and this says
that a change in one component of wt has no eﬀect on the other components
because the components are orthogonal (uncorrelated). The elements of the
Θi are interpreted as responses of the system to such innovations and the jk-th
element of Θi is assumed to represent the eﬀect on variable j of a unit innovation
in the k-th variable that has occurred i periods ago.
If we want to verify that there is no response at all of one variable to an
impulse in one of the other variables, we must use the matrix Θi and its elements
θjk,i. In fact, if yt is a K-dimensional stable VAR(p) process for j ￿= k:
θjk,i = 0 for i = 0,1,2,... ⇐⇒ θjk,i = 0 for i = 0,1,...,p(K − 1).
There is a problem related to the ordering of the variables, because we can
not determined it. The ordering has to be such that the ﬁrst variable is the
only one with a potential immediate impact on all other variables. The second
variable may have an immediate impact on the last K −2 components of yt but
not on y1t and so on.
2.2.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) answers the following ques-
tion: what portion of the variance of the forecast error in predicting yi,t+h is
due to the structural shock wi?
We take the MA representation of a VAR process with orthogonal white
noise innovations:
yt = µ +
∞ ￿
i=0
Θiwt−i (2.22)
with Σw = IK, the error of the optimal h-step forecast is:
yt+h − yt(h)=
h−1 ￿
i=0
Φiut+h−i =
h−1 ￿
i=0
Θiwt+h−i.
2The Choleski Decomposition says that if A is a positive deﬁnite (m×m)m a t r i x ,t h e n
there exists a lower (upper) triangular matrix P with positive main diagonal such that:
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Let’s θmn,i the mn-th element of Θi,t h eh-step forecast error of the j-th com-
ponent of yt is:
yj,t+h − yj,t(h)=
K ￿
k=1
(θjk,0wk,t+h + ···+ θjk,h−1wk,t+1).
Then we have that wk,t’s are uncorrelated and have unit variances, the MSE of
yj,t(h)i s :
MSE(yj,t(h)) =
K ￿
k=1
(θ2
jk,0 + ···+ θ2
jk,h−1)
and the contribution of innovations in variable k to the forecast error variance
of variable j
θ2
jk,0 + ···+ θ2
jk,h−1 =
h−1 ￿
i=0
(e￿
jΘiek)2.
Using all these equations, we have the proportion of the h−step forecast error
variance of variable j:
wjk,h =
h−1 ￿
i=0
(e￿
jΘiek)2/MSE[yj,t(h)]. (2.23)
2.3 Estimation of a VAR model
In this section we assume that our VAR(p) process is stationary and stable:
yt = ν + A1yt−1 + ···+ Apyt−p + ut (2.24)
and we assume that all the coeﬃcients ν,A1,...,A p,Σu are unknown and we
use this time series data to estimate the coeﬃcients.
2.3.1 Multivariate Least Square Estimation
We analyze the multivariate least squares (LS) estimation, we consider our
VAR(p) model and we deﬁne:
Y := (y1,...,y T)( K × T)
B := (ν,A1,...,A p)( K × (Kp+ 1))
Zt := (1,y t,...,y t−p+1)￿ ((Kp+ 1) × 1)
Z := (Z0,...,Z T−1)( ( Kp+ 1) × T)
U := (u1,...,u T)( K × T)
y := vec(Y )( KT × 1)
β := vec(B)( ( K2p + K) × 1)
b := vec(B￿)( ( K2p + K) × 1)
u := vec(U)( KT × 1)18 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
where vec(A)=



a1
. . .
an


 trasforms an (m × n) matrix A into an (mn × 1) vector
by stacking the columns. We have the VAR(p) model for t =1 ,...,T in the
compactly formula3:
Y = BZ + U or vec(Y )=( Z￿ ⊗ IK)vec(B)+v e c ( U) (2.25)
or y =( Z￿⊗IK)β+u. Remind that Σu = IT⊗Σu, we can obtain the multivariate
LS estimation (or also the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation) of β by
minimize the following function of β:
S(β)=u￿(IT ⊗ Σu)−1u =[ y − (Z￿ ⊗ IK)β]￿(IT ⊗ Σ−1
u )[y − (Z￿ ⊗ IK)β]
= y￿(IT ⊗ Σ−1
u )y + β￿(ZZ￿ ⊗ Σ−1
u )β − 2β￿(Z ⊗ Σ−1
u )y. (2.26)
Then using the ﬁrst order condition, deriving the function S(β)r e s p e c tt oβ
and equating it at zero we have:
ˆ β =( ( ZZ￿)−1 ⊗ Σu)(Z ⊗ Σ−1
u )y =( ( ZZ￿)−1Z ⊗ IK)y. (2.27)
The LS estimator is the same that we can obtain by the OLS regression and we
can also write this estimator in a diﬀerent form:
vec( ˆ B)=( ( ZZ￿)−1Z⊗IK)vec(Y )=v e c ( YZ ￿(ZZ￿)−1) ⇐⇒ ˆ B = YZ ￿(ZZ￿)−1.
We consider the LS estimator and we deﬁne: Γ := plimZZ￿/T,s ow eh a v e
the following:
Proposition 4. Let yt be a stable, K-dimensional VAR(p) process with stan-
dard white noise residuals, ˆ B = YZ ￿(ZZ￿)−1 is the LS estimator of the VAR
coeﬃcient B and plim ˆ B = B:
√
T(ˆ β − β)=
√
Tvec( ˆ B − B)
d −→ N(0,Γ−1 ⊗ Σu). (2.28)
2.3.2 Testing for Causality
If we want to test the Granger-causality, we need to test zero constraints for the
coeﬃcients:
H0 : Cβ = c against H1 : Cβ ￿= c
3Let A =( aij)a n dB =( bij)b e( m × n)a n d( p × q), the (mp × nq)m a t r i x
A ⊗ B :=
2
6
4
a11B. . .a 1nB
. . .
. . .
am1B. . .a mnB
3
7
5
is the Kronecker product or direct product.2.4. CRITERIA FOR VAR ORDER SELECTION 19
where C is an (N × (K2p + K)) matrix of rank N and c is an (N × 1) vector.
Using the estimator for Σu and Γ we ﬁnd the following statistic:
λW =( C ˆ β − c)￿
￿
C((ZZ￿)−1 ⊗ ˆ Σu)C￿
￿−1
(C ˆ β − c)
d −→ χ2(N).
Otherwise if we want to testing the instantaneous causality, we need to test
zero restrictions for the σ =v e c h ( Σ u): 4
H0 : Cσ = 0 against H1 : Cσ ￿=0 .
We have the following statistic:
λW = T˜ σ￿C￿[2CD
+
K(˜ Σu ⊗ ˜ Σu)D
￿+
K C￿]−1C˜ σ
d −→ χ2(N)
where ˜ Σu is a plausible estimator and is asymptotically equivalent to ˆ Σu.Then
D
+
K is the Moore-Penrose5 (generalized) inverse of the duplication matrix DK
and C is an (N × K(K + 1)/2) matrix of rank N.
If we use the Choleski decomposition of Σu and the lower triangular matrix
P, we note that instantaneous noncausality implies zero elements of Σu and so
also of P and we have the following hypothesis:
H0 : Cvech(P)=0
and the statistics:
λW = Tvech( ˜ P)￿C￿[C ˆ ¯ Hˆ Σ˜ σ ˆ ¯ H￿C￿]−1Cvech( ˜ P)
d −→ χ2(N)
where ¯ H =[ LK(IK2 + KKK)(P ⊗ IK)L￿
K]−1,t h e nKmn is the commutation
matrix deﬁned such that vec(G)=Kmnvec(G￿) for any matrix G and LK is
the elimination matrix deﬁned such that vech(F)=LKvec(F) for any matrix
F and ﬁnally the ˜ P and ˜ σ are derived from the asymptotic distribution.
2.4 Criteria for VAR order selection
We use diﬀerent criteria for choosing the VAR order selection: FPE,AIC, HQ
and SC.
i) The Akaike’s Final Prediction Error criterion, called FPE, was designed as
an estimator of the prediction error and it is strongly biased in the ﬁnite
sample case, i.e, in the case that the number of given data is not large
compared to the maximum candidate order. The criterion is:
FPE(m)=d e t
￿
T + Km+1
T
T
T − Km− 1
˜ Σu(m)
￿
=
￿
T + Km+1
T − Km− 1
￿K
det ˜ Σu(m).
4The vech operator takes only the elements below and on the main diagonal of a square
matrix. If A is an (m × m)m a t r i x ,v e c h ( A)i sa nm(m +1 ) /2v e c t o r .
5Am a t r i xBi sc a l l e dMoore-Penrose (generalized) inverse of A if its satisﬁes the following
four conditions: ABA = A; BAB = B;( AB)￿ = AB;( BA)￿ = BA and we denote it by A+.20 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
The VAR order estimate is obtained as that value for which the two forces
are balanced optimally.
ii) The Akaike’s Information Criterion, called AIC, is based on the minimiza-
tion of the forecast MSE, it is an objective measure of model suitability
which balances model ﬁt and model complexity. For a VAR(m)p r o c e s s
the criterion is:
AIC(m)=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
2
T
(number of freely estimated parameters)
=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
2mK2
T
.
iii) The Hannan-Quinn Criterion, called HQ, is a consistent criterion and can
be applied to regression model and for the VAR(m) process the criterion
is:
HQ(m)=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
2lnlnT
T
(# freely estimated parameters)
=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
lnT
T
mK2.
iv) The Bayesian Information Criteria or Schwarz Criteria, called SC or BIC,
is a consistent criterion and it focuses on the Bayesian arguments and for
the VAR(m) process the criterion is:
SC(m)=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
lnT
T
(# freely estimated parameters)
=l n|˜ Σu(m)| +
lnT
T
mK2.
In the last three diﬀerent criteria we choose the order estimated ˆ p so that it
minimizes the value of the criteria. In the last two criteria we also substitute
the non negative function of the AIC criterion with the logarithm.
Proposition 5. Let yTM+1,...,y o,y 1,...,y T be any K-dimensional multiple
time series and suppose that VAR(m) models, m =0 ,1,...,M are ﬁtted to
y1,...,y T. Then we have the following results:
ˆ p(SC) ≤ ˆ p(AIC) if T ≥ 8
ˆ p(SC) ≤ ˆ p(HQ) for all T
ˆ p(HQ) ≤ ˆ p(AIC) if T ≥ 16.
2.5 Structural Vector Autoregressions
We deﬁne our K-dimensional stationary, stable VAR(p):
yt = A1yt−1 + ···+ Apt − p + ut2.5. STRUCTURAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS 21
where yt is a (K × 1) vector of observable time series variables, Aj is a (K ×
K) matrices and ut is a K-dimensional white noise, with ut ∼ (0,Σu). In
this section we analyze the Structural Vector Autoregression, called SVAR and
the restrictions that we do to identify the relevant innovations and impulse
responses.
The SVAR models are usually used to study the average response of the
model variables to a given one-time structural shock, they allow the construction
of forecast error variance decompositions that quantify the average contribution
of a given structural shock to the variability of the data.
The SVAR models use nonsample information in specifying unique innova-
tions and unique impulse responses, we introduce three diﬀerent SVAR models:
the A-Model, the B-Model and the AB-Model.
2.5.1 The A-Model
If we want to ﬁnd a model with instantaneously uncorrelated residuals, we have
to model the instantaneous relations between the observable variables directly.
We consider a structural form model:
Ayt = A∗
1yt−1 + ···+ A∗
pyt−p + εt (2.29)
where A∗
j := AAj (j =1 ,...,p) and εt := Aut ∼ (0,Σε = AΣuA￿)T h e
restrictions have to be such that the system of equations has an unique solution:
A−1ΣεA￿−1 =Σ u and CAvec(A)=cA (2.30)
where CAvec(A)=cA are the arbitrary restrictions on A and CA is a 1
2K(K +
1) × K2) selection matrix and cA is a suitable 1
2K(K + 1) × 1) ﬁxed vector.
Proposition 6 (Identiﬁcation of the A-Model).
Let Σε be a (K×K) positive diagonal matrix and let A be a (K×K) nonsingular
matrix. Then for a given symmetric, positive deﬁnite (K × K) matrix Σu,a n
(N × K2) matrix CA and a ﬁxed (N × 1) vector cA, the system of equations in
(2.30) has a locally unique solution for A and the diagonal elements of Σε if
and only if
rk


−2D
+
K(Σu ⊗ A−1) D
+
K(A−1 ⊗ A−1)DK
CA 0
0 Cσ

 = K2 +
1
2
K(K + 1)
where the DK is the duplication matrix and Cσ is a selection matrix which
selects the elements of vech(Σε) below the main diagonal.
2.5.2 The B-Model
If we want to identify the structural innovations ￿t directly from the forecast
errors or reduced form residuals ut, we have to think of the forecast errors as
linear functions of the structural innovations. We have the following relations:22 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELS
ut = Bεt and Σu = BΣεB￿ and we assume that εt ∼ (0,I K). We have the
following restrictions:
Σu = BB￿ and CBvec(B) = 0 (2.31)
where CB is an (N × K2) selection matrix.
Proposition 7 (Local Identiﬁcation of the B-Model).
Let B be a nonsingular (K × K) matrix. Then for a given symmetric, positive
deﬁnite (K × K) matrix Σu and an (N × K2) matrix CB, the system in (2.31)
has a locally unique sollution if and only if:
rk
￿
2D
+
K(B × Ik)
CB
￿
= K2.
2.5.3 The AB-Model
We consider both types of restrictions of the two previously models and we
have a AB-Model: Aut = Bεt and εt ∼ (0,I K). In this case a simultaneous
equations system is formulated for the errors of the reduced form model rather
than the observable variables directly. We write the following two restrictions
for our model:
Σu = A−1BB￿A￿−1; CAvec(A)=cA and CBvec(B)=cB. (2.32)
Proposition 8 (Local Identiﬁcation of the AB-Model).
Let A and B be nonsingular (K × K) matrices. Then, for a given symmetric,
positive deﬁnite (K × K) matrix Σu, the system of equations in (2.32) has a
locally unique solution if and only if
rk


−2D
+
K(Σu ⊗ A−1)2 D
+
K(A−1B ⊗ A−1)
CA 0
0 CB

 =2 K2.
2.5.4 Estimation of Structural Parameters
We used a AB-model and the A− and B−models are special cases of the
AB−model. We want to estimate the following SVAR model:
Ayt = AAYt−1 + Bεt (2.33)
where the Y ￿
t−1 := [y￿
t−1,...,y￿
t−p], A := [A1,...,A p] and εt is assumed to
be white noise with covariance matrix IK, εt ∼ N(0,I K). The reduced form
residuals corresponding to (2.33) have the form ut = A−1Bεt and we have that
at ∼ N(0,Σ=A−1BB￿(A−1)￿).2.5. STRUCTURAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS 23
We have that the log-likelihood function for a sample y1,...,y T is seen to
be:
lnl(A,A,B)=−
KT
2
ln2π −
T
2
ln|A−1BB￿A￿−1|
−
1
2
tr{(Y − AX)￿[A−1BB￿A￿−1]−1(Y − AX)}
=constant +
T
2
ln|A|2 −
T
2
ln|B|2
−
1
2
tr{A￿B￿−1B−1A(Y − AX)(Y − AX)￿}
where Y := [y1,...,y T], X := [Y0,...,Y T−1] and we have the following two
rules: |A−1BB￿(A−1)￿| = |A−1|2|B|2 = |A|−2|B2| and tr(VW)=t r ( WV)
We maximize the log-likelihood function with respect to A and we obtain:
ˆ A = YX ￿(XX￿)−1. (2.34)
If only just-identifying restrictions are imposed on the structural parameters,
we have for the ML estimator of Σu,
˜ Σu = T−1(Y − ˆ AX)(Y − ˆ AX)￿ = ˜ A−1 ˜ B˜ B￿ ˜ A￿−1.
Otherwise if over-identifying restrictions have been imposed on A and/or B,
the corresponding estimator for
˜ Σr
u := ˜ A−1 ˜ B˜ B￿ ˜ A￿−1
will diﬀer from ˜ Σu.
We see that both the impulse response function and the forecast error vari-
ance decomposition are based on the structural innovations and we have that
the impulse response coeﬃcients are obtained from the matrices:
Θj =Φ jA−1B j =0 ,1,2,....24 CHAPTER 2. VAR AND SVAR MODELSChapter 3
The Theoretical Model
In this chapter we introduce a theoretical model for the analysis of our problem,
this model is related to the unemployment and the job ﬁnding and the policy
uncertainty. Our VAR analysis is justiﬁed by a recent work by Leduc and
Liu (2012)[18], who work out a structural DSGE model with labor market and
nominal frictions to investigate the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks on labor market
dynamics.
To study the macroeconomic eﬀects of uncertainty we introduce a stylized
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with labor market
search frictions. DSGE model starts specifying a number of economic agents
(like households, ﬁrms, governments) and embodying them with behavioral as-
sumptions, like the maximization of an objective function (utility).
First the economists assume sources of shocks to model (shocks to produc-
tivity, to preferences, to taxes, to monetary policy, etc), after that they study
how agents make their decisions over time as a response to these shocks. Fi-
nally they focus on investigation of aggregate outcomes, the called general equi-
librium, which are situation where the agents in the model follow a concrete
behavioral assumption (maximization or minimization) and where the decisions
of the agents are consistent with each other (the number of units of goods sold
must be equal to the number of units of goods bought).
The economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived and identical
households, where an household is a continuum of workers members and owns a
continuum of ﬁrms, each of which uses one worker to produce an intermediate
good.
In the economy at time t a fraction of the workers is unemployed and is
searching for jobs, while the ﬁrms post vacancies at a ﬁxed cost. We try to
match these two components and the number of successful matches are the
matching technology that transforms searching workers and vacancies into an
employment relation.
The real wages are Nash bargaining between searching workers and hiring
ﬁrms, the households consume diﬀerential retail goods and the retailers are in
a perfectly competitive market and they set a price for each products. The
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monetary policy is described by the Taylor rule, under which nominal interest
rate responds to deviations of inﬂation from a target and of output from its
potential.
Deﬁnition 3. The Taylor Rules are monetary policy rules that prescribe how
a central bank should adjust its interest rate policy instrument in a systematic
way in response to developments in inﬂation and macroeconomic activity. In
formula the Taylor Rules are:
i − i∗ = θπ(π − π∗)+θy(y − y∗) (3.1)
where i is the short-term nominal interest rate, i∗ is the target of interest rate, π
and π∗ are the rate of inﬂation and the inﬂation target, y is the real output and
θπ and θy are the response parameters. The (3.1) can be rewritten as follows:
i =( 1− θi)(r∗ + π∗)+θii−1 + θπ(π − π∗)+θy(y − y∗)+θ∆y(∆y − ∆y∗)
where the inertial behavior in setting interest rates is θi > 0 and we have that
the policy response to level of output gap (y − y∗) and to diﬀerence between
output growth and its potential (∆y − ∆y∗) and the r∗ is the natural interest
rate in equilibrium.
If there is a positive shock to inﬂation, then the Federal Reserve (FED) would
raise the nominal interest rate more than point-for-point, increasing the real
interest rate. The FED raises the nominal interest rate of inﬂation if inﬂation
rises above its target and/or if output is above potential output. We can write
the monetary policy rule:
r∗
t = πt + δ(πt − π∗)+wˆ yt + R∗
where the r∗
t is the short-term nominal interest rate target, called Federal funds
rate; the π∗ is about 2%, the ˆ yt is the deviation of output from its long-run
trend, called output gap. The R∗ is the equilibrium level of interest rate (real)
and it is about 2%.
3.1 The Model
The Households
The households consume and invest a quantity of retail goods and the utility
function of the households is:
E
￿ ∞ ￿
t=0
βtAt(lnCt − χNt)
￿
(3.2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is a parameter and is the subjective discount factor; At is the
intertemporal preference shock; Ct is the consumption. χ is a parameter, the3.1. THE MODEL 27
disutility from working and Nt is the fraction of household members who are
employed.
The growth rate of the intertemporal preference shocks is γat and it is the
ratio between At and At−1. This growth rate follows the stochastic process1
lnγat = ρa lnγa,t−1 + σatεat
where ρa ∈ (−1,1) is the persistence of preference shock, εat is a normal indepen-
dent identiﬁed distribution and σat denotes the time-varying standard deviation
of innovation to preference shock and it is called preference uncertainty shock,
which follows the stationary process:
lnσat =( 1− ρσa)lnσa + ρσa lnσa,t−1 + σσaεσa,t
where ρσa ∈ (−1,1) measures the persistence of preference uncertainty; εσa,t is
the innovation to preference uncertainty shock and it is distributed as a normal
process; σσa is the constant standard deviation of the innovation.
The households maximize the utility function (3.2) subject to a budget con-
straint, holds for all t:
Ct +
Bt
PtRt
=
Bt−1
Pt
+( 1− τt)[wtNt + φ(1 − Nt)] + dt − Tt (3.3)
where Pt is the price level; Bt denotes the household’s holdings of nominal
risk-free bond; Rt denotes the nominal interest rate; wt denotes the real wage
rate; φ denotes the unemployment beneﬁt; dt denotes the proﬁt income from
household’s ownership of intermediate goods producers and of retailers and Tt
is the lump-sum taxes.
We assume that τt is the labour income tax rate and it follows the stochastic
process:
lnτt =( 1− ρτ)lnτ + ρτ lnτt−1 + στtετt
where ρτ ∈ (−1,1) is the persistence of tax shock; ετt is an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal process and στt is the time-varying stan-
dard deviation of innovation to tax shocks and it is called the tax uncertainty
shock. The στt follows the stationary process:
lnστt =( 1− ρστ)lnστ + ρστ lnστ,t−1 + σστεστ,t
where ρστ ∈ (−1,1) measures the persistence of tax uncertainty, εστ,t is the
innovation to the tax uncertainty shock and is a standard normal process and
σστ is the (constant) standard deviation of the innovation.
The optimal bond-holding decisions result in the intertemporal Euler equa-
tion:
1=Etβγa,t+1
Λt+1
Λt
Rt
πt+1
where Λt denotes the marginal utility of consumption and πt = Pt
Pt−1 is the
inﬂation rate.
1A stochastic process is a family of random variables {xt : t ∈ T} deﬁned on a probability
space {Ω,F,P},w h e r eT is a set of time point.28 CHAPTER 3. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The aggregation sector
The ﬁnal consumption good, which is a basket of diﬀerentiated retail goods, is
written as:
Yt =
￿￿ 1
0
Yt(j)
η−1
η
￿ η
η−1
where Yt(j)i sat y p ej retail good for j ∈ [0,1] and η>1 denotes the elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerentiated products. We have the following problem:
min
￿ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di s.t 1 = Yt
where Pt(j) is the price of retail good of type j and the demand for a type j
retail good is inversely related to the relative price:
Y d
t (j)=
￿
Pt(j)
Pt
￿−η
Yt.
The price index Pt is related to the individual prices Pt(j) through the following
relation:
Pt =
￿￿ 1
0
Pt(j)
1
1−η
￿1−η
.
The retail goods producers
We take a continuum of retail goods producer that produce a diﬀerentiated prod-
uct using a homogenous intermediate good as input. The production function
of retail good of type j ∈ [0,1] is given by:
Yt(j)=Xt(j)
where Xt(j) is the input of intermediate goods used by retailer j and Yt(j)i s
the output. The retail goods producers are price takers in the input market and
monopolistic competitors in the product markets, where they set prices for their
products. We assume that the price adjustment costs are in units of aggregate
output and are subject to a quadratic cost
Ωp
2
￿
Pt(j)
πPt−1(j)
− 1
￿2
Yt
where the parameter Ωp ≥ 0 measures the cost of price adjustments and π
denotes the steady-state inﬂation rate.
A retail ﬁrm that produces good j solves the following proﬁt-maximizing
problem
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞ ￿
i=0
βiΛt+i
Λt
￿￿
Pt+i(j)
Pt+i
− qt+i
￿
Y d
t+i(j) −
Ωp
2
￿
Pt+i(j)
πPt+i−1(j)
− 1
￿2
Yt+i
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where qt+i denotes the relative price of intermediate goods in period t+i.I na
symmetric equilibrium with Pt(j)=Pt for all j we have
qt =
η − 1
η
+
Ωp
η
￿
πt
π
￿
πt
π
− 1
￿
− Et
βΛt+1
Λt
Yt+1
Yt
πt+1
π
￿
πt+1
π
− 1
￿￿
.
If Ωp = 0 (i.e. there is no price adjustment costs) the optimal pricing rule
implies that real marginal cost qt is the inverse of the steady state markup
(qt =( η − 1)/η).
The labor market
We assume that at the beginning of our analysis in period t there are ut un-
employed workers searching for jobs and there are vt vacancies posted by ﬁrms.
The matching variable is described using a Cobb-Douglas function2
mt = µuα
t v
1−α
t
where mt is the number of successful matches and the parameter α ∈ (0,1)
denotes the elasticity of job matches with respect to the number of searching
workers and µ scales the matching eﬃciency.
We deﬁne two diﬀerent rates related to the matching theory:
i) The job ﬁlling rate is the probability that an open vacancy is matched with
a searching workers, qv
t = mt/vt.
ii) The job ﬁnding rate is the probability that an unemployed and searching
worker is matched with an open vacancy, qu
t = mt/ut.
In period t there are Nt−1 workers, a fraction ρ of these workers lose their
jobs and we have that (1 − ρ)Nt−1 is the number of workers who survive the
job separation. At time tm t matches are formed and we can assume that new
hires start working in the period they are hired, so we have that aggregate
unemployment in period t evolves according to
Nt =( 1− ρ)Nt−1 + mt.
The number of unemployed workers searching for jobs in period t is
ut =1− (1 − ρ)Nt−1.
We assume full participation, i.e. at all times all individuals are either employed
or willing to work and we have that the unemployment rate is:
Ut = ut − mt =1− Nt
and means the fraction of the population who are left without a job after hiring
takes place in period t.
2The Cobb-Douglas function has the following form F(K,AL)=BKα(AL)1−α where the
parameters α ∈ (0,1) and B is assumed positive, the K,AL are variables that in the growth
theory describe the capital and the eﬀective labor force.30 CHAPTER 3. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The ﬁrms (intermediate goods producers)
We know that a ﬁrm can produce a good only if a match with a worker is
formed. The production function for a ﬁrm with one worker is
xt = Zt
where xt is the output and Zt is an aggregate technology shock, which follows
the stochastic process
lnZt =( 1− ρz)lnZ + ρz lnZt−1 + σztεzt.
The ρz ∈ (−1,1) measures the persistence of the technology shock. The term εzt
is an i.i.d innovation to the technology shock and is a standard normal process.
The term σzt is a time-varying standard deviation of the innovation, denotes the
technology uncertainty shock and it follows the stationary stochastic process
lnσzt =( 1− ρσz)lnσz + ρσz lnσz,t−1 + σσzεσz,t.
The parameter ρσz ∈ (−1,1) measures the persistence of the technology un-
certainty, the εσz,t is the innovation to the technology uncertainty and is a
standard normal process and the parameter σσz > 0 is the standard deviation
of the innovation.
If a match is formed, the ﬁrms obtain a ﬂow proﬁt in the current period after
paying the worker. In the t + 1 period, if the match survives (with probability
1 − ρ), the ﬁrm continues, otherwise (with probability ρ) the ﬁrm posts a new
job vacancy at a ﬁxed cost κ with the value Vt+1. The value of a ﬁrm with a
match is therefore given by the Bellman equation
JF
t = qtZt − wt +E t
βΛt+1
Λt
￿
(1 − ρ)JF
t+1 + ρVt+1
￿
. (3.4)
Each new vacancy posted in period t costs κ units of ﬁnal goods, the vacancy
can be ﬁlled with probability qv
t and the ﬁrms obtain the value of the match.
Otherwise the vacancy remains unﬁlled and the ﬁrms go into the next period
with the value Vt+1, so we have that the value of an open vacancy is:
Vt = −κ + qv
t JF
t +E t
βΛt+1
Λt
(1 − qv
t )Vt+1.
Free entry implies that Vt = Vt+1 = 0 and
κ = qv
t JF
t . (3.5)
If we put the equation (3.5) in the equation (3.4) we obtain:
κ
qv
t
= qtZt − wt +E t
βΛt+1
Λt
(1 − ρ)
κ
qv
t+1
. (3.6)3.1. THE MODEL 31
Workers’ value function
If a worker is employed, he obtains an after-tax wage income and suﬀers a utility
cost for working in period t. In the next period, the match is dissolved with
probability ρ and the separated worker can ﬁnd a new match with probability
qu
t+1. Otherwise the worker does not ﬁnd a new job in t + 1 period with proba-
bility ρ(1 − qu
t+1) and so he enters in the unemployment pool. The (marginal)
value of an employed worker satisﬁes the Bellman equation:
JW
t =( 1−τt)wt−
χ
Λt
+Et
βΛt+1
Λt
￿
[1−ρ(1−qu
t+1)]JW
t+1+ρ(1−qu
t+1)JU
t+1
￿
(3.7)
where JU
t is the value of an unemployed household member. If a worker is
currently unemployed, then he obtains an after-tax unemployment beneﬁt and
can ﬁnd a new job in period t + 1 with probability qu
t+1. Otherwise he remains
unemployed. The value of an unemployed worker thus satisﬁes the Bellman
equation is
JU
t = φ(1 − τt)+E t
βΛt+1
Λt
￿
qu
t+1JW
t+1 +( 1− qu
t+1)JU
t+1
￿
. (3.8)
The Nash bargaining wage
The ﬁrms and the workers bargain over wages and we have the following Nash
bargaining problem:
max
wt
(JW
t − JU
t )b(JF
t )1−b
where b ∈ (0,1) is the bargaining weight for workers. We can deﬁne the total
surplus as St = JF
t + JW
t − JU
t and the bargaining solution is given using the
ﬁrst order condition and the total surplus equation:
JF
t =( 1− b)St JW
t − JU
t = bSt. (3.9)
Then from equations (3.7) and (3.8) we have that the total surplus is a
function of the total surplus at time t +1
bSt =( 1− τt)(wN
t − φ) −
χ
Λt
+E t
βΛt+1
Λt
￿
(1 − ρ)(1 − qu
t+1)bSt+1
￿
. (3.10)
Using the equations (3.5),(3.9) and (3.10) we have the Nash bargaining wage3:
wN
t [1−τt(1−b)] = (1−b)
￿
χ
Λt
+φ(1−τt)
￿
+b
￿
qtZt +β(1−ρ)Et
βΛt+1
Λt
κvt+1
ut+1
￿
.
The Nash bargaining wage is a weighted average of the worker’s reservation
value and the ﬁrm’s productive value of a job match adjusted for labor income
taxes borne by the worker. By forming a match, the worker incurs a utility cost
of working and foregoes the after-tax unemployment beneﬁt; the ﬁrm receives
the marginal product from labor in the current period and saves the vacancy
cost from the next period.
3See the Appendix B for the complete proof.32 CHAPTER 3. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
Government policy
The government ﬁnances exogenous spending Gt and unemployment beneﬁt
payments φ through labor income taxes and lump-sum taxes. We assume that:
i) the government balances the budget in each period so that
Gt + φ(1 − Nt)=Tt + τt[wtNt + φ(1 − Nt)]
ii) the ration of government spending to output gt = Gt/Yt follows the station-
ary stochastic process:
lngt =( 1− ρg)lng + ρg lngt−1 + σgεgt
where ρg ∈ (−1,1) is the persistence parameter, the innovation εgt is
an i.i.d standard normal process, and σg is the time-varying standard
deviation of the innovation and it is an uncertainty shock to government
spending.
The government spending uncertainty shock follows the stationary stochastic
process
lnσgt =( 1− ρσg)lnσg + ρσg lnσg,t−1 + σσgεσg,t
where the parameter ρσg ∈ (−1,1) is the persistence of uncertainty shock to
government spending, the term εσg,t denotes the innovation to the uncertainty
shock and is a standard normal process and the parameter σσg > 0i st h e
standard deviation of the innovation.
The government conducts a monetary policy by following the Taylor Rule
Rt = rπ∗
￿
πt
π∗
￿φπ￿
Yt
Y
￿φy
where the parameters φπ and φy determine respectively the aggressiveness of
monetary policy against deviations of inﬂation from the target π∗ and the extent
to which monetary policy accommodates output ﬂuctuations. The parameter r
is the steady-state real interest rate and is equal R/π.
Search equilibrium
In a search equilibrium, the markets for bonds, capital, ﬁnal consumption goods,
and intermediate goods all clear.
Since the aggregate supply of the nominal bond is zero, the bond market-
clearing condition implies that
Bt =0 .
The goods market clearing condition, that is Y = Cd + Id + G where Y is the
current production function, the Cd is the current demand for consumption; Id
is the demand for investment and G is government spending, implies:
Ct + κvt +
Ωp
2
￿
πt
π
− 1
￿2
Yt + Gt = Yt.3.1. THE MODEL 33
where Yt is the aggregate output of ﬁnal goods.
The intermediate goods market clearing implies that:
Yt = ZtNt.34 CHAPTER 3. THE THEORETICAL MODELChapter 4
Data Analysis
In this chapter we examine the theoretical model using actual data and we
analyze the US quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter in 1985 to the third quarter
in 2010. The data are: VIX Index, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (created
by Baker, Bloom and Davis), unemployment rate, quarterly inﬂation rate, job
creation rate, job destruction rate, job-ﬁnding rate, Federal Funds rate and
CBO’s output gap.
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter we make a description of all these data.
Then we create two diﬀerent models and we estimate using a VAR model and
we search the possible relationships between the policy uncertainty shock and
the data related to the labor market (unemployment rate, job creation rate, job
destruction rate and job-ﬁnding rate) and to the inﬂation.
In the second part we delete the data related to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and
search for possible diﬀerences between the two models. Finally we introduce a
new variable, the new economic policy uncertainty index, created in 2013 and
we focus on possible diﬀerences.
4.1 Data Description
VIX Index
The VIX index is the CBOE1 volatility index, which shows the market’s ex-
pectation of 30-day volatility. The VIX is based on the S&P 500 Index (SPX)2,
the core index for US equities, and estimates expected volatility by averaging
the weighted prices of SPX puts and calls over a wide range of strike prices.
VIX is a volatility index comprised of options rather than stocks, with the
price of each option reﬂecting the market’s expectation of future volatility. The
1Chicago Board Options Exchange is the world’s largest options exchange and it focuses
on options contracts for individual equities, indexes and interest rates.
2The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) is a stock market index based on market
capitalizations of 500 leading companies publicly traded in the U.S. stock market.
3536 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
generalized formula for VIX index calculation is:
σ2 =
2
T
￿
i
∆Ki
K2
i
eRTQ(Ki) −
1
T
￿
F
K0
− 1
￿2
(4.1)
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Figure 4.1: VIX Index (1985:01-2010:03)
where σ is VIX/100 and VIX = σ×100; T is the time to expiration; F is the
Forward index level3 derived from the index option prices; K0 is the ﬁrst strike
below the forward index level; Ki is the strike price of the i-th out-of-the-money
option (if Ki >K 0 it’s a call, otherwise it’s a put, if Ki = K0 it’s both a put
and a call); R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration and Q(Ki)r e p r e s e n t s
3To determine it, the CBOE chooses a pair of put and call options with prices that are
closest to each other.4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 37
the average of the call and put option prices at strikes. Since K0 ≤ F,t h e
average at K0 implies that CBOE uses one unit of the in-the-money call at K0.
The last term in the equation (4.1) represents the adjustment needed to convert
this in-the-money call into an out-of-the-money put using put-call parity.
∆Ki is the interval between strike prices, it’s the diﬀerence between the
strike on either side of Ki:∆ Ki =( Ki+1 − Ki−1)/2.
From the Figure 4.1, we see that there are some spikes in the 1987:04 and
1988:01 (Black Monday and stock market crash4.), also in the period between
2002 and 2004. In the period around 2008:04 and 2009:01, we have the biggest
and strong increase and peak due to the ﬁnancial crisis. Otherwise there are
decreases in the period between 1992-1995 and 2005-2006 (where we have also
the minimum in 2006) and in the mid of 2007. So an increase in the VIX index
is related to the economic recession.
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Baker, Bloom and Davis [2] construct the economic policy uncertainty in-
dex using three types of underlying components. The ﬁrst component quantiﬁes
the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty, the second one
uses the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years and
the third one utilizes disagreement among economic forecasters as a proxy of
uncertainty.
a) News coverage is an index of search results from 10 U.S. newspapers: USA
Today,t h eMiami Herald,t h eChicago Tribune,t h eWashington Post,t h e
Los Angeles Times,t h eBoston Globe,t h eSan Francisco Chronicle,t h e
Dallas Morning News,t h eNew York Times and the Wall Street Journal.
Baker, Bloom and Davis make month-by-month searches of each paper,
starting in January 1985, for terms related to economic and policy uncer-
tainty. They search in particular for articles containing the term ’uncer-
tainty’ or ’uncertain’, the terms ’economic’ or ’economy’ and one or more
of the following terms: ’policy’, ’tax’, ’spending’, ’regulation’, ’federal re-
serve’, ’budget’, or ’deﬁcit’. Then they count the number of articles that
satisfy our search criteria each month, which create our monthly series.
They normalize the raw counts by the number of news articles in the same
newspapers that contain the term ’today’, and then calculate a backwards-
looking 36-month moving average to smooth this series at a monthly level.
For each newspaper they divide the policy-related uncertainty counts by
the smoothed value of ’today’ series and they sum each paper’s series and
normalize them to an average value of 100 from 1985 to 2010.
b) The tax code expiration is based on reports by the CBO5 that makes lists of
temporary federal tax code provisions. The temporary tax code provisions
4See in Appendix A.1
5The CBO is the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, it produces independent analyses of bud-
getary and economic issues to support the Congressional budget process.38 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
lead to outlooks for federal spending and borrowing and to discrepancies
between the tax revenues projections of the CBO and OMB6.T h eC B O
uses ’current law’ as a baseline taking into account all scheduled tax ex-
pirations, while the OMB uses ’current policy’ as a baseline under its
assessment of which temporary provisions are likely to be extended.
The CBO reports describe the tax code provisions and identiﬁes the sched-
uled expiration month and then they weight these data in January of each
year multiplying expirations by 0.5((T+1)/12) for T equal to the number of
months in the future when the tax code provision expires. Then they sum
the discounted number of tax code expirations to have an index value for
each January.
c) The economic forecaster disagreement is based on the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. This survey is also
called the Anxious Index, is a highly report on the prospects for the econ-
omy of the United States. This index often goes up just before the reces-
sions began and is a quarterly one, each quarter every forecaster receives
a form in which to ﬁll out values corresponding to previsions for variables
in each of the next ﬁve quarters. They use it for three of the forecast vari-
ables, the consumer price index (CPI)7, purchase of goods and services by
state and local governments, and purchase of goods and services by the
federal government. They look at the quarterly previsions for the next
year and they choose it because they are directly inﬂuenced by monetary
policy and ﬁscal policy actions.
To build the dispersion component, they take the interquartile range of
each set of inﬂation rate forecasts in each quarter, then they use the raw in-
terquartile range. For both federal and state/local government purchases,
we divide the interquartile range of four-quarter-ahead forecasts by the
median four-quarter-ahead forecast and multiply that quantity by a 5-
year backward-looking moving average for the ratio of nominal purchases
to nominal GDP. They sum the two weighted values to build up the single
federal/state/local index and they look at the interquartile range scaled
by the ratio of governments purchases to the economy.
To build up our index they normalize each component by its own stan-
dard deviation and then they compute an average value of the components,
using weights of 1/2 on news-index and 1/6 on each of the other three mea-
sures (tax expirations index, the CPI forecast disagreement measure, and the
federal/state/local purchases disagreement measure).
The policy uncertainty index can be calculated using other two weighting
methodologies. First, they equally weight the news-based measure, the combi-
6The OMB is the Oﬃce of Management and Budget and it assists the U.S. President to
prepare the budget.
7The CPI is a measure of the average change over time in the prices paid by urban con-
sumers for a market basket of consumer good and services. It can be used as a measure of
inﬂation and is viewed as an indicator of the eﬀectiveness of government economic policy. It’s
computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 39
nation of the forecast disagreement measures, and the tax expiration measure.
Second, they perform a principle component analysis on four previously series
to obtain weights for each components and the weights are: 0.35 on news-based
index. 0.37 on tax expirations index, 0.24 on the CPI forecast disagreement
measure, and 0.04 on our federal expenditure disagreement measure.
From the ﬁgure 4.2 we ﬁnd spikes related to Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy
and TARP8 and banking crisis and Obama election in 2008-2009. We can see
also a spike at the end of 2001, due to the 9/11, and a spike in the 2003, due
to the Second Gulf War. In the plot we can also see a spike at the beginning of
1987 (the Black Monday) and in 1990 (the First Gulf War).
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Figure 4.2: Policy-Related Economic Uncertainty Index (1985:01-
2010:03)
8The Troubled Asset Relief Program(TARP) is created to implement programs to stabilize
the ﬁnancial system during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008.40 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
Unemployment Rate
The unemployment rate is calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
of the U.S. Department of Labor and it’s the percent of the labor force that is
unemployed. Persons are classiﬁed as unemployed if they do not have a job,
have actively looked for a work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available
for work.
Actively looking for a work may consist of: having a job interview, sending
out resumes or ﬁlling out applications, placing or answering advertisements, etc.
The research is based on questions related to work and searching jobs and it is
based on the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years old and over.
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Figure 4.3: Unemployment Rate (1985:01-2010:03)
From the ﬁgure 4.3 we can see that we have high spikes from 2009 till our
days, the unemployment rate grows up till 9.7% and this increase is due to the4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 41
subprime mortgage crisis9 (Lehman Brother crisis).
There are also some spikes from the end of 1991 to the beginning of 1993, be-
cause the 1990s began with a recession caused by several contractionary shocks
to aggregate demand: tight monetary policy, the savings-and-loan crisis, and a
fall in consumer conﬁdence coinciding with the Gulf War. The unemployment
rate decreased during the long expansion of the 1990s due to the increase in
technological progress.
Otherwise the unemployment rate decreases in 1999 and 2000, when it was
only 3.9%, but then it increases again. By the end of recession in 2001, the
unemployment rate continue to increase, specially one year and a half after the
oﬃcial end of recession (in 2003). This was called the jobless recovery, because
many ﬁrms and consumers had turned skeptical of the New Economy and despite
the good news on productivity they did not want to make the same mistake as
in the 1990s. So in 2002-2003 there was a period in which high productivity
growth led to an increase rather than a decrease in unemployment.
Quarterly Inﬂation Rate
We analyze the annualized quarterly inﬂation rate calculated using the GDP
deﬂator. The inﬂation rate is the rate at which the general level of prices for
goods and services is rising and purchasing power is falling.
The GDP Deﬂator is a measure of the prices of all the goods and services
produced in the domestic economy and it’s also called the implicit price deﬂator
for GDP. This deﬂator takes the value of output produced in a given year and
compares the value of that output using that year’s prices to the value of that
output using some base year’s prices. The GDP deﬂator in year t is deﬁned Pt:
Pt =
Nominal GDPt
Real GDPt
and is an index number, its level is chosen arbitrarily and has no economic
interpretation. The nominal GDP is the value of goods and services measured
at current prices, otherwise the real GDP is the same value but measures using
a constant set of prices. Its rate of change (Pt − Pt−1)/Pt−1 gives the rate at
which the general level of prices increases over time, the rate of inﬂation.
The GDP deﬂator and the CPI have three diﬀerences. The ﬁrst diﬀerence
is that the GDP deﬂator measures the price of all goods and services produced,
whereas the CPI measures the price of only the goods and services bought
by consumers. The second diﬀerence is that the GDP deﬂator includes only
those goods produced domestically and the imported goods are not part of the
GDP. The third diﬀerence is related to the weights of prices in the economy.
The CPI assigns ﬁxed weights to the diﬀerent goods, whereas the GDP deﬂator
assigns changing weights. So the CPI is computed using a ﬁxed basket of goods,
whereas the GDP deﬂator allows the basket of goods to change over time as the
composition of GDP changes.
9See in the Appendix A.3.42 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.4: Inﬂation Rate (1985:01-2010:03)
In the ﬁgure 4.4 there are some interesting decreasing spikes around the 2009,
due to Fed actions (interest rate were cut to virtually zero and Fed massively ex-
panded its balanced sheet by purchasing Treasury Bonds and Mortgage Backed
securities) and also between the 1997 and 1998. Otherwise there are some spikes
at the beginning of the plot in 1989-1990 (due to Black Monday) and also after
some period of stationarity (in the last quarter of 2005 and in the beginning of
2007).4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 43
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Figure 4.5: Job Creation Rate (1985:01-2010:03)
Job Creation Rate
The job creation rate is a rate related to the creation of new jobs. We can
write the rate of job creation from t − 1t ot:
JCt =
￿
e
￿
Zet
Zt
￿
|max{0,g et}| =
￿
e
|max{0,EMPet − EMPe,t−1}|/Zt (4.2)
where Zt =
￿
Zet, Zet =0 .5(EMPet −EMPe,t−1) is a measure of employer size
and EMP denotes the number of employees and get =( E M P et−EMPe,t−1)/Zet
is the growth rate from t − 1t ot at employer e.
From the ﬁgure 4.5 we see that there are important spikes at the beginning
of the plot, specially from the 1986 to 1989. Then there is a decrease till the
begin of 1992, but there is also an increase with a spike in 2000. After that big44 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
spike, there is no more spikes and our function is decreasing till our days. This
decrease is due to the economic crisis and the Lehman Brother’s crisis that do
not create new jobs.
Job Destruction Rate
The job destruction rate is a rate related to the job ”destruction”. We can
write the rate of job destruction from t − 1t ot:
JDt =
￿
e
￿
Zet
Zt
￿
|min{0,g et}| =
￿
e
|min{0,EMPet − EMPe,t−1}|/Zt. (4.3)
Equation (4.3) says that job destruction from t − 1t ot is the sum of all
employment reductions at shrinking units and it’s expressed as a rate by dividing
through by total employment.
We see that the job destruction rate is a decreasing function, we have the
maximum at the beginning in the 1985 and then we have a minimum in the ﬁrst
quarter of the 2007 and after this decrease we have an increase with a spike at
the end of 2008 and begin of 2009, but then there is only a continuously decrease
till our days.
Job-ﬁnding Rate
The job-ﬁnding rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the ﬂow from another activity
into employment to the number of people seeking jobs and also is the fraction
of unemployed workers who ﬁnd new jobs in a given period.
We have fm the job-ﬁnding rate that potentially varies across the length of
the unemployment period, m. The number of persons unemployed for m months
is Um that satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation:
˙ Um = −fmUm
such that
Um = e−
R m
0 fsdsU0
where U0 is the constant number of workers that ﬂows into unemployment. The
total number of unemployed persons in the economy is U =
￿ ∞
0 Umdm and the
fraction of the workers that ﬁnd a job is:
f =
1
U
￿ ∞
0
fmUmdm =
U0
U
which is the average job-ﬁnding rate across unemployed workers.
In our case (see ﬁgure 4.7) there are spikes in the ﬁrst two quarter of 1989
but then there is a decrease till 1992 and then we have an increase till the
maximum of our rate in 2000-2001. After this increase it starts a continuously
decrease till our days (the minimum is in the begin of 2010).4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 45
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Figure 4.6: Job Destruction Rate (1985:01- 2010:03)
Federal Funds Rate
The Federal Funds Rate is the interest rate on overnight loans between banks.
The Federal Funds Rate is the interest rate at which a depository institution
lends immediately available funds (balances at the Federal Reserve) to another
depository institution overnight.
When the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)10 wishes to reduce the
interest rates, they will increase the supply of money by buying government
securities. When additional supply is added, the interest rate (cost of money)
10The FOMC set the target federal funds rate and is composed of the board of governors,
which has seven members, and ﬁve reserve bank presidents. The FOMC decide whether
increase or decrease the money supply, which the FED does by buying and selling government
securities.46 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.7: Job-Finding Rate (1985:01-2010:03)
falls, otherwise when the Committee wishes to increase the Fed Funds Rate,
they will instruct the Desk Manager to sell government securities and then the
cost of money will rise again.
We see from the ﬁgure 4.8 that the Federal Funds Rate is a decreasing
function with some important spikes. The most important spike is between
the end of 1988 and the end of 1989 due to confusion about FED response to
the stock market fall. Then there are other important spikes around the 2000
(important US recession) and in 2006-2007, but after that spikes we can see that
there are only substantial decreases and in the last years the Fed Funds Rate is
only 0.12%, it is smaller than the 1990s FFR, around 9%.
The sharp decline in the federal funds rate in the early 1990s, from close 10%
in 1989 to around 3% in 1992, was not enough to avoid recession, it reduces its4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 47
Time
f
f
r
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
Figure 4.8: Federal Funds Rate (1985:01-2010:03)
depth and its length. In 2001 again, the Fed aggressively cut the federal funds
rate from 7% down to 2% at end of the year. Again, these cuts were not enough
to avoid recession, they clearly limited its depth and its length and also in
2009-2010 they cut from 5% down to 0.1% but the recession is still present.
CBO’s Output Gap
The CBO’s output gap is the gap between actual GDP and potential GDP
and we use it to estimate the future course of inﬂation. The potential GDP
is computed from the real gross domestic product, which comprises the out-
put of ﬁve sectors: nonfarm business (GDPnfb), government (GDPgovt), farm
(GDPfarm), households and nonproﬁt institutions (GDPhhnp), and residential48 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.9: CBO’s Output Gap (1985:01-2010:03)
housing (GDPhousing):
GDP = GDPnfb +G D P govt +G D P farm +G D P hhnp +G D P housing
where GDP is the gross domestic product.
In the ﬁgure 4.9 we see a small spike in the 1989, but also in the 2006. There
is a big spike in the 1999-2000, reﬂecting the fact that the period was one of
high optimism on the part of both ﬁrms and consumers. For ﬁrms, the New
Economy appeared to promise high proﬁts and thus to justify the high rates of
investment, for the consumers the rise of the stock market justiﬁed high rates
of consumption.
We see that in 2001 there is a decrease in the output gap, a short recession11,
because, feeling that economy was slowing down, the Fed aggressively decreased
interest rates to stimulate demand. This was, however, not enough to avoid a
small recession, but it would have surely been deeper and longer in the absence
of the decrease in interest rate. This short recession followed a record-long US
11See the Appendix A.2.4.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 49
expansion.
Otherwise the CBO’s output gap decreases after the spikes and there is a
collapse around the 2006, when the gap starts to decrease signiﬁcantly till our
days (the minimum (-7.7)) and it’s related to the Great Recession.50 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
4.2 Model without VIX index (1985:01-2010:03)
We estimate our model and we search the possible relationships between the
policy uncertainty shocks, the labor market’s variables and the inﬂation rate.
We deﬁne the model without the VIX Index.
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Figure 4.10: Residuals of the model without VIX index (1985:01-2010:03)
Our model is composed by a constant, a trend and then a vector of variables
(data): POLUNCBBD is the policy uncertainty index, URATE is the unem-
ployment rate, INFLGDP is the quarterly inﬂation rate, VACANCYRATE is
the job creation rate, SEPARRATE is the job destruction rate, JOBFINDRATE
is the ﬁnding rate, FFR is the federal fund rate and YGAPCBO is the CBO’s
output gap.
In this section we use the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and some
of its function (the impulse response function and the forecast error variance4.2. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2010:03) 51
decomposition) to understand and to discover the possible relationships between
the policy uncertainty shocks and the labor market’s variables.
VAR Analysis
Using the Akaike’s Information Criterion we have a VAR(3) model and we
estimate all the variables related to a VAR(3) model with constant and trend.
After the VAR estimation, we see the residuals and their progresses and there
are some positive and negative peaks in all the series and all the residuals have an
oscillatory and stationary movement. Also we see that there are some problems
due to last quarters of our data, specially during the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 and
in the following section we study our results without the ﬁnancial crisis’ data.
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Figure 4.11: Rec-CUSUM stationary process
We analyze if in our model there are some important and structural changes52 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
and we use the Rec-CUSUM stationary function12 for all the series.
From the ﬁgure 4.11 we see that we have some structural changes in the
unemployment rate and also in the inﬂation rate, but if we do also the Recursive
CUSUM test we see that:
> sctest(reccusum$stability$urate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: reccusum$stability$urate
S = 1.3021, p-value = 0.002142
and we reject the null hypothesis and we have structural changes in the unem-
ployment rate. Analyzing the graphic 4.11, there are structural changes around
the 1995-1996 and also in 2007-2008.
In fact in 1995-1996 there was the US federal government shutdown, conﬂicts
between democratic president Clinton and the Congress over ﬁnding the medi-
care, education, environment and public health in the 1996 federal budget. In
the 2007-2008 U.S. were aﬀected by the subprime mortgage crisis, called ”Great
Recession”.
Otherwise if we take the inﬂation rate test, we have:
> sctest(reccusum$stability$inflgdp)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: reccusum$stability$inflgdp
S = 0.8593, p-value = 0.09391
and if we take the conﬁdence level α by default 0.05, we accept the null hypoth-
esis and we have no structural changes in the inﬂation rate that means that the
inﬂation rate is stationary, otherwise if we take the conﬁdence level equal to 0.1,
we should refuse the null hypothesis and we have structural changes.
12The Rec-CUSUM processes contain cumulative sums of recursive standardized residuals.4.2. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2010:03) 53
Impulse Response Analysis
We know that if a variable k does not Granger-cause the set of remaining vari-
ables, then there is no eﬀect between the former variable and all the other ones.
In our case we have that all the variables cause the other so we proceed to the
impulse response analysis.
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Figure 4.12: IRF of unemployment rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)
First of all we start our analysis from the response of unemployment to an
impulse in policy uncertainty index and we have from the ﬁgure (4.12) that a
shock in economic policy leads to a strong increase in unemployment in the ﬁrst
7 quarters. About 8 quarters after the shock there is a constant and persistent
decrease in unemployment rate and after that it becomes constant. We can
notice that a shock in economic policy leads always to a positive response in54 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
unemployment rate. So the policy uncertainty inﬂuences positively the unem-
ployment rate.
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Figure 4.13: IRF of inﬂation rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-2010:03)
If we see (ﬁgure 4.13) the response of inﬂation to an impulse in policy un-
certainty index, we have that a shock in economic policy leads to a negative
and decreasing eﬀect in inﬂation rate in the ﬁrst 5/6 quarters. After 8 quarters
we have an increasing and positive eﬀect in inﬂation (for a small period) and
then we have only a decrease eﬀect in inﬂation. So we have that a shock in eco-
nomic policy inﬂuences negatively the inﬂation rate and just for a small period
this inﬂuence is positively, but the inﬂation rate is not inﬂuenced by the policy
uncertainty shocks.4.2. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2010:03) 55
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Figure 4.14: IRF of job creation’s rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)
Now we focus (ﬁgure 4.14) on the response of job creation rate to an impulse
in policy uncertainty index and the shock in economic policy leads to a strong
decrease in the job creation rate in the ﬁrst 5 quarters (we can see a negative
peak around 5 quarters after the shock). After that decreasing function, we
have an increase in the job creation rate that leads to positive values. So we
have that a shock in economic policy inﬂuences strongly and negatively the job
creation rate in the ﬁrst period.56 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
If we analyze (ﬁgure 4.15) the response of job destruction rate to an impulse
in economic policy, we have that a shock in economic policy leads to a positive
increase in job destruction rate in the ﬁrst 5 quarters (reaches a peak about 2
quarter after the shock). After 6 quarters there is a signiﬁcant decrease that
leads to a negative shock around 8 quarter. A shock leads to positive eﬀects in
job destruction rate in the ﬁrst period.
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Figure 4.15: IRF of job destruction’s rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)4.2. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2010:03) 57
We can also analyze (ﬁgure 4.16) the response of job ﬁnding rate to an
impulse in economic policy and a shock in economic policy leads to a decrease
in job ﬁnding rate in the ﬁrst 7 quarters. So we have that a shock in policy
uncertainty inﬂuences negatively the job ﬁnding rate during all the period.
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Figure 4.16: IRF of job ﬁnding rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
We focus on the Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), which is based
upon the orthogonalized impulse response coeﬃcient matrices and allow us to
analyze the contribution of variable j to the h−step forecast error variance of
variable k. From Table 4.1 as years go by the economic policy uncertainty is
inﬂuenced more by the unemployment, the inﬂation and the job ﬁnding rate58 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
Table 4.1: FEVD of policy uncertainty index
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 73% 7% 3% 2% 2% 9% 2% 1%
4yrs ahead 58% 12% 10% 5% 2% 9% 2% 1%
10yrs ahead 37% 14% 16% 5% 2% 23% 1% 1%
shocks and less by its own shocks. From Table 4.2 the inﬂuence of economic
Table 4.2: FEVD of unemployment rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 50% 21% 3% 3% 2% 15% 6%
4yrs ahead 37% 20% 23% 3% 1% 11% 2% 3%
10yrs ahead 26% 18% 22% 5% 2% 23% 1% 2%
policy uncertainty shocks on the unemployment rate falls as years go by, oth-
erwise the unemployment rate is inﬂuenced by the job ﬁnding and the inﬂation
rate shocks. From Table 4.3 the inﬂation rate is always inﬂuenced by own shocks
Table 4.3: FEVD of inﬂation rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 4% 3% 66% 2% 3% 6% 1% 14%
4yrs ahead 3% 3% 62% 2% 4% 6% 2% 16%
10yrs ahead 5% 4% 60% 2% 4% 7% 2% 15%
and by the output gap shocks. From Table 4.4 the inﬂuence of economic policy
uncertainty shocks and own shocks on the job creation’s rate fall as years go by,
otherwise the job creation’s rate is inﬂuenced more by the inﬂation rate shocks.
From Table 4.5 the job destruction rate is inﬂuenced more by the inﬂation
rate and job ﬁnding rate shocks and less by the economic policy uncertainty
and own shocks.
From Table 4.6 the inﬂuence of economic policy uncertainty shocks fall as
years go by and on the other hand the inﬂation rate and the unemployment rate
shocks increase as years go by. From the last tables we have that the economic
policy uncertainty shocks and the own shocks fall and in both cases we have
that the inﬂuence of inﬂation rate and unemployment rate shocks increase as
years go by.
We conclude that in a model without VIX index, the policy uncertainty
shocks inﬂuence all the variables except the inﬂation rate, but this inﬂuence
falls down as years go by and on the other hand the inﬂuence of the inﬂation
rate increases.4.2. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2010:03) 59
Table 4.4: FEVD of job creation’s rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 47% 7% 14% 24% 3% 1% 3%
4yrs ahead 29% 6% 35% 15% 7% 2% 3%
10yrs ahead 25% 6% 36% 13% 9% 4% 6%
Table 4.5: FEVD of job destruction’s rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 21% 16% 3% 3% 37% 7% 2% 12%
4yrs ahead 19% 15% 5% 9% 30% 7% 3% 10%
10yrs ahead 19% 14% 12% 7% 21% 16% 3% 8%
Table 4.6: FEVD of job ﬁnding rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 43% 6% 9% 8% 3% 27% 3%
4yrs ahead 29% 10% 36% 5% 1% 13% 2% 2%
10yrs ahead 24% 13% 31% 7% 3% 19% 2% 2%
Table 4.7: FEVD of federal fund rate
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 45% 2% 10% 16% 4% 7% 15%
4yrs ahead 37% 10% 19% 12% 3% 5% 12% 2%
10yrs ahead 34% 8% 21% 13% 2% 7% 11% 2%
Table 4.8: FEVD of output gap
polunc urate inﬂgdp vacancyr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 40% 9% 4% 4% 17% 24%
4yrs ahead 30% 11% 24% 4% 12% 2% 15%
10yrs ahead 24% 14% 24% 5% 2% 20% 1% 8%60 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
4.3 Model with VIX index (1985:01 - 2010:03)
What happens if we add the VIX index? In this section we explore the eﬀects
of the VIX’s introduction on our model.
VAR Analysis
-
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
v
i
x
-
2
0
0
2
0
4
0
p
o
l
u
n
c
_
b
b
d
-
0
.
2
0
.
0
0
.
2
u
r
a
t
e
-
1
.
5
-
0
.
5
0
.
5
1
.
5
i
n
f
l
g
d
p
-
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
v
a
c
a
n
c
y
r
a
t
e
Time
-
0
.
2
0
.
0
0
.
2
s
e
p
a
r
r
a
t
e
-
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
4
j
o
b
f
i
n
d
r
a
t
e
-
0
.
6
-
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
6
f
f
r
-
1
.
0
0
.
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
y
g
a
p
c
b
o
Time
resy2
Figure 4.17: Residuals of the model with VIX index
We estimate the model using the VAR function and using the Akaike’s in-
formation criterion (AIC) we have a VAR(3) model and we are interested in
the estimation using a trend and a constant. As in the previous model we see
(ﬁgure 4.17) that the residuals have the same trend and the same problem due
to the 2007-2008 crisis period.4.3. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01 - 2010:03) 61
We keep attention on the presence or absence of structural changes in our
model using the Rec-CUSUM stationary function.
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Figure 4.18: Rec-CUSUM stationary process
From the ﬁgure 4.18 we have possible structural changes in the unemploy-
ment rate, in the job destruction rate and in the inﬂation rate. Using the
Recursive CUSUM test for the unemployment rate we have:
> sctest(reccusumy2$stability$urate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recura2
S = 1.4516, p-value = 0.000418262 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
and we reject the null hypothesis of absence of structural changes, so in our
model we have structural changes in the unemployment rate. If we look at the
job destruction rate we have:
> sctest(reccusumy2$stability$separrate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recsep2
S = 0.865, p-value = 0.09035
and if we take the conﬁdence level α by default 0.05, we accept the null hypoth-
esis and there are no structural changes in the job destruction rate. Otherwise
if we decide to take the conﬁdence level 0.1, we reject the null hypothesis and
we have structural changes in the job destruction rate.
We can make the same analysis for the inﬂation rate, in fact we have that:
> sctest(reccusumy2$stability$inflgdp)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: reccusumy2$stability$inflgdp
S = 0.902, p-value = 0.06982
and so there are some structural changes in the inﬂation rate only if we take a
small conﬁdence level α.4.3. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01 - 2010:03) 63
Impulse Response analysis
We study the impulse response function of a variable k to an impulse in policy
uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 4.19: IRF of unemployment rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)
We start our analysis from the response of unemployment rate to a policy
uncertainty shocks and we have from the ﬁgure 4.19 that a shock in policy
uncertainty leads to a strong increase in the ﬁrst seven quarters (with a peak in
7 quarter). About 8 quarters after the shock there is a persistent decrease in the
unemployment rate and we see that a shock in policy uncertainty leads always
to a positive response in unemployment rate. Comparing the ﬁgure 4.12 and
4.19 there are not signiﬁcant diﬀerences if we introduce or not the VIX index.
Is the inﬂation rate inﬂuenced by a shock in policy uncertainty? From the64 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
ﬁgure 4.20 a shock in policy uncertainty leads to a negative and decreasing eﬀect
in the inﬂation rate in the ﬁrst six quarters and after the ﬁrst period we have
that the shock in policy uncertainty does not appear to drive changes in inﬂation
rate. So we have that a shock in policy uncertainty inﬂuences negatively the
inﬂation rate in the ﬁrst period and after a certain period the inﬂation has no
more changes.
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Figure 4.20: IRF of inﬂation rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-2010:03)
Now we focus on the labor market’s variables and on their relationship with
the policy uncertainty shocks. First of all, we focus on the response of the job
creation rate to an impulse in policy uncertainty shocks.
From ﬁgure 4.21 we have that this shock leads to a strong decrease in the
job creation rate in the ﬁrst 5 quarters and after this shock of policy uncertainty
we have a constant and persistent increase in the job creation rate that leads4.3. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01 - 2010:03) 65
to positive values. So we have that a shock in policy uncertainty inﬂuences
negatively the job creation rate and comparing ﬁgure 4.14 and 4.21 we have no
changes.
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We continue our analysis with the impulse response of job destruction rate to
our policy uncertainty shocks. From ﬁgure 4.22, we have that a shock in policy
uncertainty leads to an increase in the ﬁrst 4 quarters in the job destruction rate
(with an important peak after 2 quarters) and after which we have a decreasing
and negative function in the following 11 quarters. At the end we have that
the policy uncertainty shocks become again positive and these shocks do not
appear to drive changes in job destruction rate. So we have that a shock in
policy uncertainty inﬂuences positively the job destruction rate.
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In the last ﬁgure (4.23) we have that the response of job ﬁnding rate to an
impulse in policy uncertainty shocks. A shock in policy uncertainty leads to a
negative decrease in the job ﬁnding rate in the ﬁrst 7 quarters. After 8 quarters
there is a negative increase that does not inﬂuence so much the job ﬁnding rate
and so we have that a shock in policy uncertainty inﬂuences negatively the job
destruction rate.
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Figure 4.23: IRF of job ﬁnding rate to policy uncertainty shocks (1985:01-
2010:03)
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analysis
We have some changes in the forecast variance decomposition analysis when
we add the VIX index. From Table 4.10 the economic policy uncertainty is
inﬂuenced more by the inﬂation, job ﬁnding rate shocks as years go by and68 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
Table 4.9: FEVD of VIX index
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 76% 2% 2% 4% 5% 7% 3%
4yrs ahead 69% 2% 2% 6% 3% 4% 7% 3% 2%
10yrs ahead 49% 6% 5% 15% 3% 3% 12% 3% 3%
less by its own shocks and by VIX shocks The same situation happens if we
Table 4.10: FEVD of policy uncertainty
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 42% 29% 5% 5% 3% 2% 9% 2% 1%
4yrs ahead 35% 23% 8% 13% 6% 1% 10% 3% 1%
10yrs ahead 21% 18% 10% 19% 5% 1% 22% 2% 1%
look the Table 4.11, in fact the inﬂuence of economic policy uncertainty and
VIX shocks on the unemployment rate falls as years go by, when the inﬂation
and job ﬁnding rate shocks increase. As in the model without VIX index, the
Table 4.11: FEVD of unemployment rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 32% 21% 19% 5% 4% 12% 5%
4yrs ahead 22% 14% 16% 28% 4% 9% 2% 3%
10yrs ahead 14% 12% 14% 28% 4% 2% 22% 1% 2%
inﬂation rate follows the same properties and it is inﬂuenced only by own shocks.
If we look at the labor market variables (from Table 4.13 to Table 4.15), we
have that as years go by these variables are inﬂuenced more by own shocks and
inﬂation rate shocks and on the other hand less by the economic policy shocks
and VIX shocks. From Table 4.16 the inﬂuence of inﬂation rate shocks on the
federal funds rate increases as years go by, and on the other hand we have that
the inﬂuence of economic policy uncertainty, VIX, job destruction’s rate and
own shocks falls. The last Table 4.17 tells us that the output gap is inﬂuenced
more by inﬂation and job ﬁnding rate shocks as years go by and less by the
VIX, economic policy uncertainty and own shocks.
So the introduction of the VIX index leads some changes in the forecast error
variance decomposition, because the policy uncertainty shock loses importances
and the VIX index inﬂuences the variables.
In the next section we focus on the data analysis without the ﬁnancial crisis’
data and we study the diﬀerences, if exist, between the two previous models
and the following two.4.3. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01 - 2010:03) 69
Table 4.12: FEVD of inﬂation rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 5% 5% 3% 64% 2% 3% 4% 1% 13%
4yrs ahead 5% 5% 3% 58% 2% 4% 4% 3% 15%
10yrs ahead 5% 2% 4% 57% 2% 4% 5% 3% 14%
Table 4.13: FEVD of job creation’s rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 25% 19% 5% 17% 26% 3% 3% 2%
4yrs ahead 15% 13% 4% 40% 16% 5% 5% 3%
10yrs ahead 12% 13% 5% 40% 12% 5% 5% 6%
Table 4.14: FEVD of job destruction’s rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 12% 13% 15% 2% 3% 35% 6% 2% 11%
4yrs ahead 10% 14% 14% 6% 8% 29% 6% 4% 9%
10yrs ahead 10% 14% 13% 13% 7% 20% 11% 4% 8%
Table 4.15: FEVD of job ﬁnding rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 21% 24% 5% 10% 10% 3% 23% 3%
4yrs ahead 14% 14% 7% 41% 5% 2% 12% 3% 1%
10yrs ahead 11% 11% 8% 38% 6% 2% 18% 3% 3%
Table 4.16: FEVD of federal fund rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 31% 17% 1% 9% 19% 2% 6% 14%
4yrs ahead 25% 13% 6% 22% 13% 2% 4% 14% 1%
10yrs ahead 21% 14% 6% 24% 13% 2% 4% 12% 3%
Table 4.17: FEVD of output gap
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 27% 20% 8% 5% 4% 13% 2% 20%
4yrs ahead 19% 13% 9% 28% 4% 10% 4% 13%
10yrs ahead 13% 12% 11% 29% 4% 1% 20% 2% 7%70 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
4.4 Model without VIX index (1985:01-2008:02)
What happens before the ﬁnancial crisis in the 2008? In this section we decide
to analyse the situation till the second quarter of 2008. For doing that we delete
the data related to the crisis’ year from the second quarter of 2008 to the third
quarter of 2010 and we would like to know if there are some diﬀerences respect
to the previous analysis.
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Figure 4.24: Residuals of the model without VIX index (1985:01-2008:02)
VAR Analysis
We estimate using the AIC criterion and we have as before a VAR(3) with a
constant and trend. We start our analysis from the residuals of our model and
from the ﬁgure 4.24 we have a loss of the peaks at the end of all the series
specially in the output gap series.
We study if there are some structural changes and we use the same function
as before and from ﬁgure 4.25 we have the possibility of structural changes in
the unemployment rate.4.4. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2008:02) 71
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Figure 4.25: Rec-CUSUM stationary process (1985:01-2008:02)
In fact we make the recursive-CUSUM test and we see:
> sctest(recy12008$stability$urate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy12008$stability$urate
S = 1.274, p-value = 0.002856
and we reject the null hypothesis and so there are some structural changes in the
unemployment rate like in the general model and we have the same peak around
1995/1996. Otherwise the situation is completely diﬀerent in the other variables,
because we accept always the null hypothesis and we have no structural changes,
specially for the inﬂation rate:72 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
> sctest(recy12008$stability$inflgdp)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy12008$stability$inflgdp
S = 0.6418, p-value = 0.3379
Impulse Response Analysis
If we cut the ﬁnancial crisis’s data, what happens to the impulse response func-
tion of a labor market’s variable subject to a policy uncertainty shock? We start
our analysis from the unemployment rate.
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Figure 4.26: IRF of unemployment rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008:02
From Figure 4.26, we see that a shock in policy uncertainty leads to the4.4. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2008:02) 73
same increase as in the previous case, we have only a variation, because the
decreasing function becomes also negative. The cut of the ﬁnancial crisis’ data
does not change the impulse response analysis and the policy uncertainty shock
inﬂuences positively the unemployment rate.
We focus on the inﬂation rate and on the relationships between the policy
uncertainty shocks and the inﬂation rate.
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Figure 4.27: IRF of inﬂation rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008:02
From ﬁgure 4.27 we see that there are no reactions of the inﬂation rate to a
policy uncertainty shock.
Now we focus on the labor market’s variable: the job creation rate, the job
destruction rate and the job ﬁnding rate.
From ﬁgure 4.28, a shock in policy uncertainty leads to a decrease in the
job creation rate in the ﬁrst period and the shocks in policy uncertainty have74 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
negative eﬀects on the job creation rate as in the general model.
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Figure 4.28: IRF of job creation rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008:02
In the following ﬁgure 4.29 we have that a shock in policy uncertainty leads
to a strong increase in the job destruction rate in the ﬁrst period and the
job destruction rate is inﬂuenced positively and strongly by a shock in policy
uncertainty shock.4.4. MODEL WITHOUT VIX INDEX (1985:01-2008:02) 75
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Figure 4.29: IRF of job destruction rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008:02
Finally in the job ﬁnding rate (ﬁgure 4.30), there is a decrease in the job
ﬁnding rate due to a policy uncertainty shock and this shock has negative eﬀects
on the opportunity of ﬁnding a new job.
If we continue our analysis13, we have that there are some diﬀerences between
the forecast error variance decomposition in general and restricted model. The
unemployment rate is inﬂuenced more by the output gap and the federal funds
rate shocks than the general model as years go by and less by the job ﬁnding
rate and unemployment shocks.
From Table C.4 and Table C.6 the output gap shocks inﬂuence more the job
creation’s rate and the job ﬁnding rate than the general model.
From Table C.8 the output gap is inﬂuenced more by the own, the fed-
eral funds rate and job creation’s rate shocks as years go by and less by the
13See the tables in Appendix C.1.76 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.30: IRF of job ﬁnding rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008:02
unemployment rate and the job ﬁnding rate shocks.
4.5 Model with VIX index (1985:01- 2008:02)
In this section we continue the latter analysis introducing the VIX index. So
we have delete the data related to the ﬁnancial crisis and we search if there
are some relations between the policy shocks and the unemployment rate and
if these relationships are more (respectively less) important than in the general
model.4.5. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01- 2008:02) 77
VAR Analysis
From the ﬁgure 4.31, as in the previous model the residuals improve, because
we lose the negative peaks, specially in the output gap variable.
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Figure 4.31: Residuals of the model with VIX index (1985:01 - 2008:02)
We have estimated as always the model using the same criterium and we
have a VAR(3) model with trend and constant. Comparing this model with
the general one, there are some important structural changes specially in the
unemployment rate, in the job destruction one and in the VIX index (Figure
4.32), but not in the inﬂation rate.
If we do the the Recursive CUSUM test for these three variables, we can see:
> sctest(recy22008$stability$urate)78 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.32: Rec-CUSUM stationary process with VIX(1985:01- 2008:02)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy22008$stability$urate
S = 1.4238, p-value = 0.0005747
and we refuse the null hypothesis and so there are some structural changes in
the unemployment rate. If we construct the same test for the VIX index and
the job destruction rate:
> sctest(recy22008$stability$vix)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy22008$stability$vix4.5. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01- 2008:02) 79
S = 0.9745, p-value = 0.04088
> sctest(recy22008$stability$separrate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy22008$stability$separrate
S = 0.8599, p-value = 0.09354
So we have structural changes in the VIX index and also in the job destruction
rate, but only if we choose a conﬁdence level α =0 .1, otherwise we accept the
null hypothesis.
If we look at the inﬂation rate in this model and in the relative ﬁgure, there
are no structural changes:
> sctest(recy22008$stability$inflgdp)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: recy22008$stability$inflgdp
S = 0.6933, p-value = 0.258380 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
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Figure 4.33: IRF of unemployment rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008
Impulse Response Analysis
What about the relations between the policy uncertainty shocks and the labor
market’s variables (unemployment rate, job destruction rate,...)? Do we see
some important changes? In this section we focus on possible eﬀects of the
policy uncertainty shocks in the period before the current ﬁnancial crisis.
We start our analysis from the possible relations between the policy uncer-
tainty shocks and the unemployment rate. From ﬁgure 4.33, there are positive
eﬀects of policy uncertainty shocks on the unemployment rate in the ﬁrst pe-
riod as in the general model and then negative eﬀects for a short period. Finally
the policy uncertainty shocks in both the models have the same eﬀects on the
unemployment rate.
From Figure 4.34 we have that the shock to policy uncertainty does not4.5. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1985:01- 2008:02) 81
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Figure 4.34: IRF of inﬂation rate to policy uncertainty shocks to 2008
appear to drive changes in inﬂation rate as in the model without VIX and
without ﬁnancial crisis’ data. In the job creation, job destruction and job ﬁnding
rate the diﬀerences between the ”restricted” and general models are indiﬀerent
in the impulse response analysis function.
In the forecast error variance deviation14 there are some diﬀerences in the
unemployment rate, in the labor market variables and in the output gap. In
fact the unemployment rate is inﬂuenced more by the federal funds rate and
output gap shocks and less by own shocks and job ﬁnding rate shocks as years
go by.
From Table C.13 to Table C.15 the labor market’s variables are inﬂuenced
more by the output gap and federal funds rate shocks, on the other hand they
14See the tables in Appendix C.2.82 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
are inﬂuenced less by the job ﬁnding rate shocks and VIX shocks.
From Table C.17 we have that the output gap is inﬂuenced more by the own,
the federal funds rate and the job creation’s rate shocks than in the general
model and less by the unemployment rate and job ﬁnding rate shocks as years
go by.
In the next section we continue our analysis using a new policy uncertainty
index and we look if there are some diﬀerences between the old and the new
index.
4.6 New Policy Uncertainty Index
In 2013 Baker, Bloom and Davis [3] revised the economic policy uncertainty
index and in this section we see the possible diﬀerences between the original and
the new index and if these diﬀerences inﬂuence the impulse response analysis
and the possible relationship between shocks and labor market’s variables.
This index has three component as the old one. The ﬁrst component quanti-
ﬁes newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty, the second one
reﬂects the number and size of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future
years and the last component uses disagreement among economic forecasters
about policy variables as a proxy for uncertainty.
News coverage about policy-related economic uncertainty
This component is an index related to search results from 10 large US news-
papers as in the previous index. They perform month-by-month searches of
each paper, starting in January 1985, for terms related to economic and policy
uncertainty. They search for articles containing the term ’uncertainty’ or ’un-
certain’, the terms ’economic’ or ’economy’ and one or more of the following
terms: ’congress’. ’deﬁcit’, ’federal reserve’, ’legislation’, ’regulation’ or ’white
house’.
To create the index, they normalize the raw counts of EPU15- related articles
by the total number of monthly news articles in the same newspapers. Then
they normalize each newspaper index to have a standard-deviation of 1 over
1985-2009 and add up the indices for all 10 papers. They rescale the overall
series so it averages to an average values of 100 from 1985-2009.
Tax Code Expiration Data
The Tax Code Expiration Data base on data from the CBO: lists of temporary
federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years. Temporary tax measures
are a source of uncertainty for both businesses and households because Congress
often decides to extend them at the last minute, undermining stability of and
certainty about the tax code.
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Figure 4.35: New Policy-Related Economic Uncertainty Index
(1985:01-2010:03)
Two examples are related to Bush-era and Obama-era. The ﬁrst one in-
volves the Bush-era income tax cuts originally set to expire at the end of
2010, Democrats and Republicans keep opposing positions about whether re-
verse these tax cuts and for which taxpayers. Instead of solving the uncertainty
in advance, Congress waited until December 2010 before acting.
The second example is related to Fiscal Cliﬀ crisis in December 2012. There
was a discussion between Democrats and Republicans on the increase in the
payroll tax and at the end an agreement was reached: an increase in the payroll
tax by two percentage points to 6.2% for income up to $113,700 and a reversal
of the Bush tax cuts for individuals making more than $400,000 and couples
making over $450,000, and also an increase in the tax on investment income
from 15% to 23.8% for ﬁlers in the top income bracket and a 3.8% surtax
on investment income for individuals earning more than $200,000 and couples
making more than $250,000.84 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS
The CBO reports contain data on scheduled expirations of federal tax code
provisions in the contemporaneous calendar year and each of the following 10
years. They apply a simple weighting to the data in January of each year, they
sum the total amount of the expiring tax provisions for each year in a 10-year
horizon (using the absolute value of dollars, as some expiring provisions are taxes
and some are tax cuts). Then they discount these future expirations by 50% per
year, and sum the discounted number of dollar-weighted tax code expirations to
obtain an index values for each January. They use a high discount rate because
many expiring tax code provisions are regularly renewed, and are unlikely to be
a major source of uncertainty until the expiration date looms near.
Economic Forecaster Disagreement
The last component of the index draws on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). This quarterly survey covers a
wide range of macroeconomic variables. Each quarter, every forecaster receives
a form in which to ﬁll out values corresponding to forecasts for a variety of
variables in each of the next ﬁve quarters.
They use the individual-level data for three of the forecast variables, the
consumer price index (CPI), purchase of goods and services by state and local
governments, and purchase of goods and services by the federal government. For
each series, they forecast quarterly for one year in the future and they choose
these variables because they are directly inﬂuenced by monetary policy and
ﬁscal policy decisions.
They deal the dispersion in the forecasts of these variables as proxies for
uncertainty about future monetary policy and about government purchases of
goods and services at the federal, state, and local level. For inﬂation, they look
at the individual forecasts for the quarterly inﬂation rates four quarters in the
future, and to construct the dispersion component, they take the interquartile
range.
For both federal and state and local government purchases, they divide the
interquartile range of four-quarter-ahead forecasts by the median four-quarter-
ahead forecast and multiply that quantity by a 5-year backward-looking moving
average for the ratio of nominal purchases, either federal or state/local, to nom-
inal GDP. We keep the values of the forecasters disagreement measures constant
within each calendar quarter. At the end, they sum the two indices, weighted
by their nominal sizes, to construct a single federal/state/local index.
Construction of Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
To construct the overall index of policy-related economy uncertainty, they nor-
malize each component by its own standard deviation prior to January 2012,
then compute the average value of the components, using weights of 1/2 on
broad news-based policy uncertainty index and 1/6 on each of other three mea-
sures (the tax expirations index, the CPI forecast disagreement measure, and the
federal/state/local purchases disagreement measure). They set the pre-1991 tax4.6. NEW POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDEX 85
expiration index equals to its 1991 value and at the end they normalize overall
index to have a value of 100 from 1985 to 2009.
From ﬁgure 4.35 the new policy uncertainty index has no diﬀerences with
respect to the old policy uncertainty index.
VAR Analysis
Using the new policy uncertainty variable, we have the same results as before,
in fact we have some structural changes in the unemployment rate:
> sctest(n1reccusum1$stability$urate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: n1reccusum1$stability$urate
S = 1.3074, p-value = 0.002028
But we have no more structural changes in the inﬂation rate, but only in the
job ﬁnding rate, if we use the right conﬁdence level α =0 .1:
> sctest(n1reccusum1$stability$jobfindrate)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: n1reccusum1$stability$jobfindrate
S = 0.8701, p-value = 0.08727
Also using the impulse response function we have no more changes between the
old and the new policy uncertainty index.
What happens if we add the VIX index? Are there any change in our anal-
ysis? If we look at the residuals, there are no changes, but doing the recursive
CUSUM test, we have some diﬀerences. In fact we have the structural changes
in the job destruction rate and in the unemployment rate but no more in the
inﬂation rate:
> sctest(n1reccusum2$stability$inflgdp)
Recursive CUSUM test
data: n1reccusum2$stability$inflgdp
S = 0.6241, p-value = 0.3687
Studying the impulse response function and the forecast error variance decompo-
sition, we have no diﬀerences in the relationships between the policy uncertainty
shocks and the labor market’s variables.
In conclusion the new policy uncertainty index is not diﬀerent from the old
one, except from some theoretical aspects. In the last part of the paper, we
draw the conclusions from all these diﬀerent models that we have analyzed.86 CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSISChapter 5
Conclusions
Uncertainty has become the subject of hot debates and the focus on a variety
of articles from the recession of 2007-2009. The thesis seeks to investigate the
importance of a particular type of uncertainty, namely, economic policy uncer-
tainty. It does so by employing an indicator of economic policy uncertainty
for the U.S. economy recently developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013).
We exploit exogenous variations of such indicator, identiﬁed in the context of a
VAR approach, to isolate the role played by such type of uncertainty as for the
dynamics of the U.S. labor market. We ﬁnd such shocks to be quite relevant
for understanding the dynamics of unemployment and a number of other labor
market-related indicators in the United States in the post-WWII period.
The recent contribution of Bloom (2009) has revamped the interest in uncer-
tainty shocks. If ﬁrms has no-convex adjustment costs, these uncertainty shocks
will generate powerful real-option eﬀects, pausing the build up of investments
and the hiring process by entrepreneurs. Recessions might very well be caused
by exogenous variations in uncertainty – indeed, some recent macroeconomic
investigations have found a high, negative correlation between uncertainty and
the business cycle in the U.S. and other industrialized countries (Bloom, 2009;
Leduc and Liu, 2013; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2013). Castelnuovo et al. (2013)
ﬁnd evidence in favor of non-linear reactions of unemployment to uncertainty
shocks. In particular, they ﬁnd that such shocks are more powerful during reces-
sion than expansions. However, Castelnuovo el al. (2013) miss to investigate a
number of obvious dimensions of the labor market, including job destruction, job
creation, and vacancies. Leduc and Liu (2013) show that uncertainty shocks act
as demand shocks if standard real business cycle (RBC) models are augmented
with search and matching frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities
in the good market. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012) demonstrate that such
shocks have a supply ﬂavor in presence of nominal price and wage stickiness.
Our empirical investigation shows that the economic policy uncertainty inﬂu-
ences the labor market’s variables in diﬀerent ways. In fact, in both models
(with or without the VIX index), the policy uncertainty inﬂuences positively
the unemployment rate and the job destruction’s rate. If the economic policy is
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uncertain, there is less opportunity to ﬁnd a job due to recessions and to diﬃ-
cult political situations (instability) and also the ﬁrms have less opportunity to
invest and to create new jobs. Therefore the unemployment rate and the job de-
struction’s rate increase. Otherwise the policy uncertainty inﬂuences negatively
the variables related to the job’s creation (the job creation’s rate and the job
ﬁnding rate). Therefore, economic policy uncertainty hikes, ﬁrms pause their
hirings, rendering more diﬃcult to workers to ﬁnd a job for the workers and also
the ﬁrms have diﬃculties to create jobs, because the economic policy-induced
uncertainty increases the value of the ”wait-and-see” option.
Our results are robust to a variety of robustness checks. In particular, eco-
nomic policy uncertainty shocks turn out to be important even in VARs em-
bedding a more general measure of stock-market related volatility (uncertainty)
known as VIX (Volatility IndeX). Moreover, our results are robust to dropping
ﬁnancial crisis’ data. Actually, the analysis conducted with Great Moderation
data only leads us to a statistical improvement as for our model, with residuals
which turn out to be well-behaved. As said, however, our impulse responses pre-
dict a reaction of unemployment, job creation, job ﬁnding, and job destruction
in line with what suggested by theoretical models. Finally, our results remain
unaﬀected when we consider a diﬀerent, more recent version of the economic
policy uncertainty index by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013).
Our analysis suggests that economic policy uncertainty may trigger impor-
tant reactions in the U.S. labor market dynamics. Therefore, it supports the call
by Nick Bloom (2009) for timely and clearly communicated policies. Policies
decisions taken timely, even if suboptimal (because hastily determined), may be
preferable to hard-thought policies taken with substantial delay and/or uncon-
vincingly communicated to the public. The trade-oﬀ between policy correctness
and decisiveness is likely to be one of the most exciting ones to investigate in
the future. Future analysis should also be concerned with other realities, e.g.,
European countries. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) have already developed an
economic policy uncertainty index for the major European countries. It will be
interesting to see what empirical analysis conditional on such version of index
will tell as for the power of uncertainty shocks hitting Europe.Appendix A
Economic Events
Here we present a few events which have boosted the economic policy uncer-
tainty in the U.S.
A.1 The 1987 Stock Market Crash and the Black
Monday
On October 1987 the stock market crashed with the S&P 500 stock market index
falling about 20 percent. On Black Monday it happens that many specialists
did not open for trading during the ﬁrst hour and so the values of stock market
indicies did not decline so much. Otherwise the future market opened on time
with heavy selling. So with stale quotes in the cash market and declining prices
in the futures market, a gap was created between the value of stock indexes
in the cash market and in the futures market. When stock ﬁnally opened,
prices gapped down and the index arbitragers discovered they had sold stocks
considerably below what they had been expecting and tried to cover themselves
by buying in the futures market. The S&P 500 index declined between 18 and
23 percent on the day.
The 1987 stock market crash was a shock to the stability of the ﬁnancial
system because market functioning was signiﬁcantly impaired. The Federal Re-
serve responses to the stock market crash illustrates three varieties of tools that
can be used when responding to a crisis. The ﬁrst one include the high-proﬁle
public actions taken to support market sentiment, the second one were those
that boosted the liquidity of the ﬁnancial system (use of open market operations
and lowering of federal funds rate to support the liquidity of the banking sys-
tem). At the end, the Federal Reserve encouraged various market participants,
in particular banks lending to brokers and dealers, to work cooperatively and
ﬂexibly with their costumers.
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A.2 Recession of 2001
In 2001, the US economy experienced a pronounced slowdown in economic ac-
tivity. The unemployment rate rose and the aggregate demand falls. Three
notable shocks explain this event.
The ﬁrst was a decline in the stock market. during the 1990s, the stock mar-
ket experienced a boom of historic proportions, as investor became optimistic
about the prospects of the new information technology. The fall in the market
reduced household wealth and thus consumer spending and the declining per-
ceptions of the proﬁtability of the new technologies led to a fall in investment
spending.
The second shock was the terrorist attack on New York City and Washington
D.C., on September 11, 2001. In the week after the attacks, the stock market fell
another 12 percent, which at time was the biggest weekly loss since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Moreover the attacks increased uncertainty about was
the future would hold. Uncertainty can reduce spending because households
and ﬁrms postpone some of their plans until the uncertainty is resolved.
The third shock was a series of accounting scandals at some of the nation’s
most prominent corporations, including Enron and WorldCom. The result of
these scandals was the bankruptcy of some companies that had fraudulently
represented themselves as more proﬁtable than they truly were. These events
further depressed stock prices and discouraged business investment.
Fiscal and monetary policymakers responded quickly to these events. Congress
passed a major tax cut in 2001, including an immediate tax rebate, and a second
major tax cut in 2003. One goal of these tax cuts was to stimulate consumer
spending and Congress increased government spending by appropriating funds
to assist the New York’s recovery and to bail out the ailing airline industry.
At the same time the Federal Reserve pursued expansionary monetary policy
and the money growth accelerated and interest rate fell.
Expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policy had the intended eﬀects. Economic
growth picked up in the second half of 2003 and was strong throughout 2004.
The unemployment rate was back down and it stayed at or below that level
for the next several years and begin rising again in 2008, when the economy
experienced another recession.
A.3 The Financial Crisis and Economic Down-
turn of 2008 and 2009
In 2008 the US economy experienced a ﬁnancial crisis, but this crisis starts a
few years earlier with a substantial boom in the housing market. The boom was
fueled by low interest rates, which helped the economy recover, but by making
it less expensive to get a mortgage and but a home.
Developments in the mortgage market made it easier for subprime borrowers-
those borrowers with higher risk of default based on their income and creditA.3. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ECONOMIC DOWNTURN OF 2008 AND 200991
history- to get mortgages to buy homes. One of these developments was se-
curitization, the process by which a ﬁnancial institution makes loans and then
bundles them together into a variety of ”mortgage-backed securities”. These
one are then sold to banks or insurance companies.
The high price of housing proved unsustainable and from 2006 to 2008 hous-
ing prices fell about 20 percent. Moreover, the price of housing in 2008 was
merely a return to the level that had prevailed in 2004, but, in this case, the
price decline led to a series of problematic repercussions.
The ﬁrst of these repercussions was a substantial rise in mortgage defaults
and home foreclosures. Many homeowners were underwater, they owned more
on their mortgages than their homes were worth and so they stopped paying
their loans. The banks started to taking the houses and selling them oﬀ search-
ing to recoup money.
A second repercussion was large losses at the various ﬁnancial institutions
that owned mortgage-backed securities. By borrowing large sums to buy high-
risk mortgages, these companies had bet that housing prices would keep rising,
but when this bet turned bad, they found themselves in bankruptcy.
A third repercussion was a substantial rise in stock market volatility. Many
companies rely on the ﬁnancial system to get resources they need for business
expansion or to help them manage their short-term cash ﬂows. This third
repercussion implies the forth one: a decline in consumer conﬁdence
The Fed cut its target for the federal funds rate and Congress sell money
to use to rescue the ﬁnancial system and were used for equity injections into
banks. So the US government became a part owner of these banks and the goal
of the rescue was to stem the ﬁnancial crisis on Wall Street and prevent it from
causing depression.92 APPENDIX A. ECONOMIC EVENTSAppendix B
Mathematical Results
In this section we proof the Nash bargaining wage:
wN
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κvt+1
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￿
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We need the following equations from the theoretical model:
κ = qv
t JF
t (B.2)
JF
t =( 1− b)St,J W
t − JU
t = bSt (B.3)
bSt =( 1− τt)(wN
t − φ) −
χ
Λt
+E t
βΛt+1
Λt
￿
(1 − ρ)(1 − qu
t+1)bSt+1
￿
. (B.4)
We know from (B.2) that:
κ
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We put (B.5) inside (B.4) and we have:
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Multiplying both the part by (1 − b), we have:
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.
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Solving it and deleting some values, we have as follows:
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t+1)bSt+1
￿
.
Now we solve the expected value using some properties of the expected value
and (B.2) and (B.3)
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We solve the expression in the brackets as follows:
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If we use all the expressions below, we have the (B.1).Appendix C
FEVD Tables
C.1 Model without VIX index (1987:01 - 2008:02)
In this section we explain the tables related to the Forecast Error Variance
Decomposition in the model without VIX and from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 to
the second quarter of 2008:
Table C.1: FEVD of policy uncertainty
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 80% 5% 3% 4% 4% 1% 1%
4yrs ahead 71% 5% 7% 4% 1% 3% 2% 5%
10yrs ahead 65% 6% 8% 4% 1% 3% 5% 7%
Table C.2: FEVD of unemployment rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 48% 19% 6% 14% 6% 4% 2%
4yrs ahead 25% 10% 30% 7% 3% 5% 18%
10yrs ahead 18% 9% 27% 5% 2% 2% 12% 22%
Table C.3: FEVD of inﬂation rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 1% 3% 67% 2% 2% 2% 6% 16%
4yrs ahead 6% 6% 58% 2% 3% 2% 8% 15%
10yrs ahead 6% 7% 56% 3% 3% 2% 8% 15%
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Table C.4: FEVD of job creation’s rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 39% 1% 13% 37% 3% 3% 5%
4yrs ahead 21% 5% 23% 17% 1% 4% 4% 23%
10yrs ahead 15% 5% 26% 12% 2% 5% 11% 24%
Table C.5: FEVD of job destruction’s rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 15% 25% 3% 4% 39% 3% 10%
4yrs ahead 18% 21% 4% 7% 32% 4% 2% 11%
10yrs ahead 16% 18% 10% 6% 26% 3% 5% 14%
Table C.6: FEVD of job ﬁnding rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 37% 4% 9% 15% 6% 20% 3% 5%
4yrs ahead 20% 3% 34% 9% 3% 10% 4% 17%
10yrs ahead 15% 4% 30% 7% 4% 7% 10% 22%
Table C.7: FEVD of federal fund rate
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 56% 11% 5% 10% 15% 3%
4yrs ahead 44% 10% 11% 7% 2% 17% 7%
10yrs ahead 33% 10% 16% 5% 1% 2% 19% 14%
Table C.8: FEVD of output gap
polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 21% 7% 22% 3% 8% 7% 31%
4yrs ahead 13% 3% 26% 13% 2% 5% 7% 31%
10yrs ahead 11% 4% 25% 10% 3% 4% 12% 30%C.2. MODEL WITH VIX INDEX (1987:01 - 2008:02) 97
C.2 Model with VIX index (1987:01 - 2008:02)
In this section we explain the tables related to the Forecast Error Variance
Decomposition in the model with VIX and from the ﬁrst quarter of 1985 to the
second quarter of 2008:
Table C.9: FEVD of VIX index
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 70% 3% 1% 13% 4% 2% 4%
4yrs ahead 61% 3% 1% 17% 4% 3% 2% 6%
10yrs ahead 48% 4% 2% 21% 4% 4% 2% 3% 11%
Table C.10: FEVD of policy uncertainty
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 45% 32% 5% 2% 6% 2% 6% 2% 1%
4yrs ahead 40% 29% 5% 5% 6% 2% 5% 3% 5%
10yrs ahead 34% 25% 6% 8% 6% 2% 5% 5% 8%
Table C.11: FEVD of unemployment rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 19% 29% 17% 6% 16% 6% 4% 3%
4yrs ahead 10% 15% 11% 30% 9% 3% 5% 16%
10yrs ahead 8% 11% 9% 28% 7% 2% 2% 12% 20%98 APPENDIX C. FEVD TABLES
Table C.12: FEVD of inﬂation rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 1% 1% 4% 67% 3% 2% 2% 3% 5%
4yrs ahead 5% 1% 5% 59% 2% 3% 2% 5% 21%
10yrs ahead 5% 2% 6% 56% 3% 3% 3% 11% 22%
Table C.13: FEVD of job creation’s rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 20% 18% 1% 11% 39% 2% 3% 5%
4yrs ahead 10% 12% 7% 23% 19% 1% 2% 5% 21%
10yrs ahead 8% 9% 6% 27% 12% 2% 3% 11% 22%
Table C.14: FEVD of job destruction’s rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 7% 12% 20% 4% 4% 40% 2% 2% 10%
4yrs ahead 8% 14% 17% 4% 6% 35% 2% 4% 10%
10yrs ahead 7% 12% 15% 12% 6% 27% 3% 6% 13%
Table C.15: FEVD of job ﬁnding rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 16% 24% 3% 8% 15% 6% 19% 3% 6%
4yrs ahead 8% 13% 3% 33% 9% 3% 10% 3% 16%
10yrs ahead 7% 9% 4% 30% 7% 4% 6% 10% 20%
Table C.16: FEVD of federal fund rate
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 39% 16% 11% 6% 9% 13% 5%
4yrs ahead 30% 13% 11% 11% 9% 14% 8%
10yrs ahead 21% 11% 11% 17% 6% 1% 1% 16% 15%
Table C.17: FEVD of output gap
VIX polunc urate inﬂ vacanr separ jobﬁnd ﬀr ygap
2yrs ahead 12% 15% 6% 19% 2% 6% 8% 30%
4yrs ahead 7% 9% 4% 26% 20% 2% 3% 6% 29%
10yrs ahead 7% 7% 4% 26% 9% 2% 3% 11% 28%Bibliography
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